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An Empirical Analysis of the Maturity of Debt Supply in Uruguay

Author

Listed:
  • Miguel Mello Costa

    (Banco Central del Uruguay)

Abstract

The present work carries out an analysis of the credit operations from 2005 to 2017 of all the financial institutions that report to the Central Bank of Uruguay, except the Banco Hipotecario del Uruguay, in order to understand the characteristics of the financing offer focused on the maturity of the credits. The investigation allows to distinguish by credit term and cost the preferred operation to finance longer maturity investments. Depreciable loans and leasing in indexed units arise as the preferred instruments for longer loans. Models were controlled by fixed effects in order to explain the term of credit operations concluding that a marginal increase in the interest rate reduces the duration of the credit and in turn the size of the debt is positively correlated with the maturity term.

Suggested Citation

  • Miguel Mello Costa, 2018. "An Empirical Analysis of the Maturity of Debt Supply in Uruguay," Documentos de trabajo 2018005, Banco Central del Uruguay.
  • Handle: RePEc:bku:doctra:2018005
    as

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    File URL: https://www.bcu.gub.uy/Estadisticas-e-Indicadores/Documentos%20de%20Trabajo/5.2018.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial structure; leverage; indebtedness; panel data; corporate finance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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