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Mechanisms to Appoint Arbitrator Panels or Sets of Judges by Compromise Between Concerned Parties

Author

Listed:
  • Salvador Barberà
  • Danilo Coelho

Abstract

We propose mechanisms for two parties with potentially conflicting objectives to jointly select a predetermined number of candidates to occupy decision-making positions. Two leading examples of these situations are: i) the selection of an arbitrator panel by two conflicting firms, and ii) the bipartisan coalition's selection of a set of judges to occupy court vacancies. We analyze the efficiency, fairness, and simplicity of equilibrium outcomes in strategic games induced by these mechanisms. Their effectiveness hinges on the parties' preferences over the sets containing the required number of the candidates to be chosen.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2024. "Mechanisms to Appoint Arbitrator Panels or Sets of Judges by Compromise Between Concerned Parties," Working Papers 1442, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1442
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    appointing arbitrators; appointing judges; rule of k name; split appointment rules; compromise; unanimity compromise set; top compromise set;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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