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Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution

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Author Info
Inés Macho-Stadler
David Pérez-Castrillo ()

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Abstract

It is often argued that even if optimal ex-post, settlement dilutes deterrence ex-ante. We analyze the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex-ante, to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex-ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers' true tax liability. The more informative the signal, the larger the additional expected evenue raised by the tax authority when using settlement as a policy tool.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 495.01.

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Length: 23
Date of creation: 02 Oct 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:495.01

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Related research
Keywords: Settlement; Tax evasion; Optimal auditing;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Andreoni, James, 1991. "The desirability of a permanent tax amnesty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 143-159, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1988. "Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 713-28, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Steven Shavell, 1989. "Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 183-195, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Sanchez, Isabel & Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 345-369, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Chu, C. Y. Cyrus, 1990. "Plea bargaining with the irs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 319-333, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Grossman, Gene M & Katz, Michael L, 1983. "Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 749-57, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Joerg Schiller, 2003. "The Impact of Insurance Fraud Detection Systems," Microeconomics 0309003, EconWPA, revised 02 Oct 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Inés Macho Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2005. "Optimal inspection policy and income-tax compliance," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 9-45, June. [Downloadable!]
  3. Juan Prieto-Rodriguez & Maria Jose Sanzo-Perez & Javier Suarez-Pandiello, 2005. "Análisis económico de la actitud hacia el fraude fiscal en España," Public Economics 0502005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Juan Prieto Rodríguez & María José Sanzo Pérez & Javier Suárez Pandiello, 2006. "Economic analysis of attitudes towards fiscal fraud in Spain”," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 177(2), pages 107-128, April. [Downloadable!]
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