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Adaptive Expectations, Confirmatory Bias, and Informational Efficiency

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  • Gani Aldashev
  • Timoteo Carletti
  • Simone Righi

Abstract

We study the informational efficiency of a market with a single traded asset. The price initially differs from the fundamental value, about which the agents have noisy private information (which is, on average, correct). A fraction of traders revise their price expectations in each period. The price at which the asset is traded is public information. The agents' expectations have an adaptive component and a social-interactions component with confirmatory bias. We show that, taken separately, each of the deviations from rationality worsen the information efficiency of the market. However, when the two biases are combined, the degree of informational inefficiency of the market (measured as the deviation of the long-run market price from the fundamental value of the asset) can be non-monotonic both in the weight of the adaptive component and in the degree of the confirmatory bias. For some ranges of parameters, two biases tend to mitigate each other's effect, thus increasing the informational efficiency.

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  • Gani Aldashev & Timoteo Carletti & Simone Righi, 2010. "Adaptive Expectations, Confirmatory Bias, and Informational Efficiency," Papers 1009.5075, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1009.5075
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    1. Guillaume Deffuant & David Neau & Frederic Amblard & Gérard Weisbuch, 2000. "Mixing beliefs among interacting agents," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 3(01n04), pages 87-98.
    2. Max R. Blouin & Roberto Serrano, 2001. "A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(2), pages 323-346.
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