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Regret-Free Truth-Telling Voting Rules

Author

Listed:
  • R. Pablo Arribillaga

    (Universidad Nacional de San Luis/CONICET)

  • Agustín G. Bonifacio

    (Universidad Nacional de San Luis/CONICET)

  • Marcelo A. Fernandez

    (Johns Hopkins University)

Abstract

We study the implications of regret-free truth-telling for voting rules. Regretfreeness, a weakening of strategy-proofness, provides incentives to report preferences truthfully if agents want to avoid regret. We first show that for tops-only rules regret-freeness is equivalent to strategy-proofness. Then, we focus on three families of (non-tops-only) voting methods: maxmin, scoring, and Condorcet consistent ones. We show positive and negative results for both neutral and anonymous versions of maxmin and scoring rules. We also show that Condorcet consistent rules that satisfy a mild monotonicity requirement are not regret-free, and neither are successive elimination rules. Furthermore, we provide full characterizations for the case of three alternatives and two agents.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Pablo Arribillaga & Agustín G. Bonifacio & Marcelo A. Fernandez, 2022. "Regret-Free Truth-Telling Voting Rules," Working Papers 166, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:166
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    File URL: https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/166.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-1151, November.
    2. Gori, Michele, 2021. "Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 350-369.
    3. Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel, 2018. "Deferred acceptance and regret-free truth-telling," Economics Working Paper Archive 65832, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised 31 Jul 2020.
    4. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    5. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    6. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    7. Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2003. "Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 434-441, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Bonifacio, Agustín G., 2024. "Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 12-24.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategy-proofness; Regret-freeness; Voting Rules; Social Choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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