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Cooperation And Wealth

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  • Stark, Oded

Abstract

We calculate the equilibrium fraction of cooperators in a population in which payoffs accrue from playing a single-shot prisoner's dilemma game. Individuals who are hardwired as cooperators or defectors are randomly matched into pairs, and cooperators are able to perfectly find out the type of a partner to a game by incurring a recognition cost. We show that the equilibrium fraction of cooperators relates negatively to the population's level of wealth.

Suggested Citation

  • Stark, Oded, 2003. "Cooperation And Wealth," Discussion Papers 18763, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ubzefd:18763
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.18763
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/18763/files/dpdp0059.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ken Binmore, 1998. "Game Theory and the Social Contract - Vol. 2: Just Playing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 2, number 0262024446, December.
    2. Stark,Oded, 1999. "Altruism and Beyond," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521663731.
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    Cited by:

    1. SAVVATEEV, Alexei & STARK, Oded, 2005. "An evolutionary explanation for the propensity to migrate," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Research Methods/ Statistical Methods;

    JEL classification:

    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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