IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/feemmi/232181.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Sharing R&D Investments in Breakthrough Technologies to Control Climate Change

Author

Listed:
  • Rubio, Santiago J.

Abstract

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, a three-stage technology agreement formation game is solved. First, countries decide whether or not to sign up to the agreement. Then, in the second stage, the signatories (playing together) and the non-signatories (playing individually) select their investment in R&D. In this stage, it is assumed that the signatories not only coordinate their levels of R&D investment but also pool their R&D efforts to fully internalize the spillovers of their investment in innovation. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides non-cooperatively upon its level of energy production. Emissions depend on the decisions made regarding investment and production. If a country decides to develop a breakthrough technology in the second stage, its emissions will be zero in the third stage. For linear environmental damages and quadratic investment costs, the grand coalition is stable if marginal damages are large enough to justify the development of a breakthrough technology that eliminates emissions completely, and if technology spillovers are not very important.

Suggested Citation

  • Rubio, Santiago J., 2016. "Sharing R&D Investments in Breakthrough Technologies to Control Climate Change," MITP: Mitigation, Innovation and Transformation Pathways 232181, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemmi:232181
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.232181
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/232181/files/NDL2016-002.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.22004/ag.econ.232181?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Blasch, Julia & Boogen, Nina & Filippini, Massimo & Kumar, Nilkanth, 2017. "Explaining electricity demand and the role of energy and investment literacy on end-use efficiency of Swiss households," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(S1), pages 89-102.
    2. Emilson C.D. Silva & Chikara Yamaguchi, 2018. "Overlapping Climate Clubs under Transaction Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 7319, CESifo.
    3. Miguel Borrero & Santiago J. Rubio, 2022. "An adaptation-mitigation game: does adaptation promote participation in international environmental agreements?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 439-479, September.
    4. Hans Gersbach & Marie-Catherine Riekhof, 2022. "Technology Treaties And Climate Change," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(02), pages 1-42, May.
    5. Santiago J. Rubio, 2018. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements: Adaptation and Complementarity," Working Papers 2018.29, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. Gilbert Kollenbach, 2022. "International Environmental Agreements and Black Technology," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(3), pages 601-624, July.
    7. Michael Hübler & Michael Finus, 2013. "Is the risk of North–South technology transfer failure an obstacle to a cooperative climate change agreement?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 461-479, November.
    8. Brandt, Urs Steiner & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2022. "Is the annual UNFCCC COP the only game in town?," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
    9. Takashima, Nobuyuki, 2023. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: Initial payment, technological development, and refunding," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    10. Eichner, Thomas & Kollenbach, Gilbert, 2022. "Environmental agreements, research and technological spillovers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 300(1), pages 366-377.
    11. Bian, Bo & Meier, Jean-Marie & Xu, Ting, 2021. "Cross-Border Institutions and the Globalization of Innovation," LawFin Working Paper Series 23, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin).
    12. Michael Finus & Francesco Furini & Anna Viktoria Rohrer, 2021. "International Environmental Agreements and the Paradox of Cooperation: Revisiting and Generalizing Some Previous Results," Graz Economics Papers 2021-05, University of Graz, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:feemmi:232181. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: AgEcon Search (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feemmit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.