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An insurance model to cover losses due to highly contagious animal disease in the Finnish pig sector

Author

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  • Niemi, Jarkko K.
  • Heikkilä, Jaakko
  • Myyrä, Sami

Abstract

This study analyses numerically an animal disease insurance scheme and how it could be operationalized. We focus on animal producer’s incentives to choose an insurance policy and on the feasibility of the insurance system as a whole. We develop a simple simulation model where the producer chooses whether to take an insurance policy at a given price, and the insurance provider simultaneously decides the price of the scheme. We find that producer interest towards such insurance products is limited. Uptake of insurance could be increased through collective actions such as group insurance or through support for the cost of insurance.

Suggested Citation

  • Niemi, Jarkko K. & Heikkilä, Jaakko & Myyrä, Sami, 2014. "An insurance model to cover losses due to highly contagious animal disease in the Finnish pig sector," 2014 International Congress, August 26-29, 2014, Ljubljana, Slovenia 182821, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:eaae14:182821
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.182821
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, 2004. "Neglecting Disaster: Why Don't People Insure Against Large Losses?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 5-21, January.
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    Health Economics and Policy;

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