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Eun Jeong Heo

Personal Details

First Name:Eun Jeong
Middle Name:
Last Name:Heo
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:phe459
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/eunjheo/
Terminal Degree:2012 Economics Department; University of Rochester (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

School of Economics
University of Seoul

Seoul, South Korea
http://economy.uos.ac.kr/
RePEc:edi:seuoskr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Youngsub Chun & Eun jeong Heo & Sunghoon Heo, 2017. "Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 17-00012, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Eun Jeong Heo & Sunghoon Hong & Youngsub Chun, 2022. "The top‐trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 77-91, March.
  2. Chen, Siwei & Heo, Eun Jeong, 2021. "Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: Characterizations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 22-30.
  3. Eun Jeong Heo & Sunghoon Hong & Youngsub Chun, 2021. "Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 1-19, July.
  4. Eun Jeong Heo, 2019. "Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 243-266, March.
  5. Eun Jeong Heo & Vikram Manjunath, 2017. "Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 5-30, January.
  6. Heo, Eun Jeong & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2015. "A characterization of the extended serial correspondence," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 102-110.
  7. Heo, Eun Jeong, 2014. "Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: A generalization of the serial rule and its characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 40-47.
  8. Eun Heo, 2014. "The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 439-454, May.
  9. Eun Heo, 2013. "Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 895-922, October.
  10. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Heo, Eun Jeong, 2012. "Probabilistic assignment of objects: Characterizing the serial rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 2072-2082.
  11. Youngsub Chun & Eun Jeong Heo, 2008. "Queueing problems with two parallel servers," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 299-315, June.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Youngsub Chun & Eun jeong Heo & Sunghoon Heo, 2017. "Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 17-00012, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Mohammad Akbarpour & Julien Combe & Yinghua He & Victor Hiller & Robert Shimer & Olivier Tercieux, 2020. "Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money," NBER Working Papers 27765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Heo, Eun Jeong & Hong, Sunghoon & Chun, Youngsub, 2022. "Efficient use of immunosuppressants for kidney transplants," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    3. Kratz, Jörgen, 2024. "Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    4. Mustafa Ou{g}uz Afacan & In'acio B'o & Bertan Turhan, 2020. "Assignment Maximization," Papers 2012.01011, arXiv.org.
    5. Haluk Ergin & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2018. "Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Liver Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 951, Boston College Department of Economics.
    6. Li, Mengling & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Xu, Menghan, 2023. "Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 403-427.
    7. Tayfun Sönmez & M Utku Ünver, 2017. "Market design for living-donor organ exchanges: an economic policy perspective," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 676-704.
    8. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver & Özgür Yilmaz, 2016. "How (Not) to Integrate Blood Subtyping Technology to Kidney Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 900, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 15 Oct 2017.
    9. Haris Aziz & Agnes Cseh, 2019. "Optimal Kidney Exchange with Immunosuppressants," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1915, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.

Articles

  1. Eun Jeong Heo & Sunghoon Hong & Youngsub Chun, 2022. "The top‐trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 77-91, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Heo, Eun Jeong & Hong, Sunghoon & Chun, Youngsub, 2022. "Efficient use of immunosuppressants for kidney transplants," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).

  2. Chen, Siwei & Heo, Eun Jeong, 2021. "Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: Characterizations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 22-30.

    Cited by:

    1. Siwei Chen & Yajing Chen & Chia‐Ling Hsu, 2023. "New axioms for top trading cycles," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 1064-1077, October.
    2. Siwei Chen & Yajing Chen & Chia-Ling Hsu, 2021. "New axioms for top trading cycles," Papers 2104.09157, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2021.

  3. Eun Jeong Heo & Sunghoon Hong & Youngsub Chun, 2021. "Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 1-19, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Eun Jeong Heo, 2019. "Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 243-266, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan S. Pereyra, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?," Papers 2212.02881, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
    2. Estelle Cantillon & Li Chen & Juan Sebastian Pereyra Barreiro, 2022. "Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off ?," Working Papers ECARES 2022-39, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

  5. Heo, Eun Jeong & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2015. "A characterization of the extended serial correspondence," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 102-110.

    Cited by:

    1. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2022. "Constrained random matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    2. Han, Xiang, 0. "A theory of fair random allocation under priorities," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    3. Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, 2016. "Characterizations of the cumulative offer process," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 531-542, October.
    4. Youngsub Chun & Kiyong Yun, 2020. "Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 667-687, April.
    5. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, 2023. "Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 465-484, October.
    6. Shende, Priyanka & Purohit, Manish, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    7. Haris Aziz & Yoichi Kasajima, 2017. "Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 255-275, August.
    8. Ping Zhan, 2023. "A Simple Characterization of Assignment Mechanisms on Set Constraints," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 1-15, June.

  6. Heo, Eun Jeong, 2014. "Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: A generalization of the serial rule and its characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 40-47.

    Cited by:

    1. Han, Xiang, 2016. "On the consistency of random serial dictatorship," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 168-171.
    2. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2018. "The object allocation problem with random priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 71-89.
    3. Heo, Eun Jeong & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2015. "A characterization of the extended serial correspondence," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 102-110.
    4. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2022. "Constrained random matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    5. Ortega, Josué, 2020. "Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 15-24.
    6. Yoshio Sano & Ping Zhan, 2021. "Extended Random Assignment Mechanisms on a Family of Good Sets," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 1-30, December.
    7. Han, Xiang, 0. "A theory of fair random allocation under priorities," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    8. Youngsub Chun & Kiyong Yun, 2020. "Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 667-687, April.
    9. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, 2023. "Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 465-484, October.
    10. Shende, Priyanka & Purohit, Manish, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    11. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 14-25.
    12. Haris Aziz & Yoichi Kasajima, 2017. "Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 255-275, August.
    13. Eun Jeong Heo & Vikram Manjunath, 2017. "Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 5-30, January.
    14. Basteck, Christian, 2018. "Fair solutions to the random assignment problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 163-172.
    15. Ping Zhan, 2023. "A Simple Characterization of Assignment Mechanisms on Set Constraints," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 1-15, June.
    16. Y. Charles Li & Hong Yang, 2016. "A mathematical model of demand-supply dynamics with collectability and saturation factors," Papers 1606.06720, arXiv.org.

  7. Eun Heo, 2014. "The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 439-454, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2016. "Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule," ISER Discussion Paper 0971, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. Heo, Eun Jeong & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2015. "A characterization of the extended serial correspondence," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 102-110.
    3. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2022. "Constrained random matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    4. Heo, Eun Jeong, 2014. "Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: A generalization of the serial rule and its characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 40-47.
    5. Shende, Priyanka & Purohit, Manish, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    6. Priyanka Shende & Manish Purohit, 2020. "Strategy-proof and Envy-free Mechanisms for House Allocation," Papers 2010.16384, arXiv.org.
    7. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 14-25.
    8. Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2018. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 327-363.
    9. Doğan, Battal & Doğan, Serhat & Yıldız, Kemal, 2018. "A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 178-200.

  8. Eun Heo, 2013. "Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(4), pages 895-922, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas, 2020. "On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness:median-voting over intervals," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 20.04, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    2. Aziz, Haris & Chan, Hau & Lee, Barton E. & Parkes, David C., 2020. "The capacity constrained facility location problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 478-490.
    3. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi, 2016. "Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    4. Lars Ehlers, 2022. "Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 367-384, September.
    5. Carmelo Rodríguez-à lvarez, 2017. "On single-peakedness and strategy-proofness: ties between adjacent alternatives," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(3), pages 1966-1974.
    6. Olivier Bochet & Sidartha Gordon & René Saran, 2013. "Weighted Majoritarian Rules for the Location of Multiple Public Facilities," Sciences Po publications 2013-15, Sciences Po.
    7. Haris Aziz & Hau Chan & Barton E. Lee & Bo Li & Toby Walsh, 2019. "Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Perspectives," Papers 1911.09813, arXiv.org.
    8. Protopapas, Panos, 2018. "On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals," MPRA Paper 83939, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  9. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Heo, Eun Jeong, 2012. "Probabilistic assignment of objects: Characterizing the serial rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 2072-2082.

    Cited by:

    1. HOUGAARD, Jens L. & moreno-ternero, JUAN D. & OSTERDAL, Lars P., 2013. "Assigning agents to a line," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Christopher P Chambers & Federico Echenique, 2021. "Empirical Welfare Economics," Papers 2108.03277, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    3. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2018. "The object allocation problem with random priorities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 71-89.
    4. Youngsub Chun & Boram Park, 2014. "A Graph Theoretic Approach to the Slot Allocation Problem," Working Paper Series no92, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
    5. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2020. "Short trading cycles: Paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 78-87.
    6. Heo, Eun Jeong & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2015. "A characterization of the extended serial correspondence," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 102-110.
    7. Saban, Daniela & Sethuraman, Jay, 2014. "A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 283-289.
    8. Balbuzanov, Ivan, 2022. "Constrained random matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    9. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    10. Hashimoto, Tadashi & Hirata, Daisuke & Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Unver, Utku, 2014. "Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    11. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars H., 2023. "On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2023-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    12. Altuntaş, Açelya & Phan, William & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 156-181.
    13. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2015. "Size versus fairness in the assignment problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 119-127.
    14. Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, 2016. "Characterizations of the cumulative offer process," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 531-542, October.
    15. Youngsub Chun & Kiyong Yun, 2020. "Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 667-687, April.
    16. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, 2023. "Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 465-484, October.
    17. Chang, Hee-In & Chun, Youngsub, 2017. "Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 80-92.
    18. Heo, Eun Jeong, 2014. "Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: A generalization of the serial rule and its characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 40-47.
    19. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars H., 2022. "Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2022-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    20. Yajing Chen & Patrick Harless & Zhenhua Jiao, 2021. "The probabilistic rank random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization," Papers 2104.09165, arXiv.org.
    21. Wonki Jo Cho, 2018. "Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 137-162, June.
    22. Bogomolnaia, Anna, 2015. "Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 308-318.
    23. Shende, Priyanka & Purohit, Manish, 2023. "Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    24. Priyanka Shende & Manish Purohit, 2020. "Strategy-proof and Envy-free Mechanisms for House Allocation," Papers 2010.16384, arXiv.org.
    25. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 14-25.
    26. Haris Aziz & Yoichi Kasajima, 2017. "Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 255-275, August.
    27. Sulagna Dasgupta & Debasis Mishra, 2022. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 651-664, December.
    28. Yajing Chen, 2017. "New axioms for deferred acceptance," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 393-408, February.
    29. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars, 2021. "Strategy-Proof and Envy-Free Random Assignment," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 307, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    30. Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu & Ünver, M. Utku, 2017. "On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 56-62.
    31. Sulagna Dasgupta & Debasis Mishra, 2020. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model," Discussion Papers 20-06, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    32. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 176-179.
    33. Ping Zhan, 2023. "A Simple Characterization of Assignment Mechanisms on Set Constraints," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 1-15, June.
    34. Andrew McLennan & Shino Takayama & Yuki Tamura, 2024. "An Efficient, Computationally Tractable School Choice Mechanism," Discussion Papers Series 668, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    35. Anna Bogomolnaia, 2015. "The Most Ordinally-Efficient of Random Voting Rules," HSE Working papers WP BRP 106/EC/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    36. Huang, Chao & Tian, Guoqiang, 2017. "Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 1-8.
    37. Harless, Patrick, 2019. "Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 107-116.
    38. Eun Heo, 2014. "The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 439-454, May.

  10. Youngsub Chun & Eun Jeong Heo, 2008. "Queueing problems with two parallel servers," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 299-315, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Stark, Oded & Budzinski, Wiktor & Kosiorowski, Grzegorz, 2019. "Switching queues, cultural conventions, and social welfare," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 278(3), pages 837-844.
    2. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2008. "Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-17, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    3. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2019. "Recent developments in the queueing problem," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 27(1), pages 1-23, April.
    4. Atay, Ata & Trudeau, Christian, 2024. "Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 104-125.
    5. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2012. "Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 473-480, March.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

Featured entries

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki entries:
  1. Korean Economists

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2017-09-17
  2. NEP-HEA: Health Economics (1) 2017-09-17

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