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Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange

Author

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  • Kratz, Jörgen

Abstract

There is no conflict between maximizing the number of transplants and giving priority to, e.g., highly HLA-sensitized recipients in kidney exchange programs that only permit pairwise exchanges. In some programs that feature cyclic exchanges or chains, however, giving priority to some recipients may reduce the number of transplants that can be carried out. This paper identifies the conditions under which there is a trade-off between prioritization and transplant maximization objectives. The results show that kidney exchange programs can permit some cyclic exchanges and chains without introducing such trade-offs. Whether or not a kidney exchange program has conflicting objectives and regardless of how recipients are prioritized, it can ensure a Pareto efficient outcome by selecting from a new class of matchings. These generalize several classes of matchings used in practice and studied in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Kratz, Jörgen, 2024. "Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:217:y:2024:i:c:s0022053124000097
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105803
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    Keywords

    Kidney exchange; Desensitization; Priority; Matroid; Simplicial complex;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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