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Is corporate philanthropy a pretext for executives' excess perk consumption? Evidence from China

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  • Zhi Su
  • Bo Yi
  • Linan Wang

Abstract

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2019, we investigate the impact of corporate philanthropy on excess perks. Companies are likely to make philanthropic donations from the motivations of building political connections, serving the personal interests of self‐serving managers, disguising excess perks and deviating public attention, leading to higher excess perks. Agency theory is probably a view to interpret the positive relationship. From the perspectives of CEO power and board effectiveness, we examine the impact of corporate governance on the relationship between corporate philanthropy and excess perks. The findings provide valuable insights for directors, managers and shareholders.

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  • Zhi Su & Bo Yi & Linan Wang, 2022. "Is corporate philanthropy a pretext for executives' excess perk consumption? Evidence from China," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 4010-4027, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:8:p:4010-4027
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.3643
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    Cited by:

    1. Jyun‐Ying Fu, 2023. "Customer concentration and corporate charitable donations: Evidence from China," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(1), pages 545-561, January.

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