IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/canjec/v35y2002i2p385-409.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A model of evidence production and optimal standard of proof and penalty in criminal trials

Author

Listed:
  • Okan Yilankaya

Abstract

The defendant is either innocent or guilty, which she, not the court or prosecutor, knows. The court convicts the defendant whenever its posterior probability of her guilt – which depends on the evidence presented – is greater than the standard of proof. Evidence production by litigating parties is a costly stochastic process. Subsequently, the optimal choice of standard of proof and penalty is analysed. The optimal standard of proof is increasing in the cost of convicting an innocent defendant and decreasing in the cost of acquitting a guilty defendant. Higher penalties may increase probabilities of both false conviction and false acquittal. Un modèle de production de la preuve et la norme optimale de la preuve et de la punition dans les procès criminels. On développe un modèle de production de la preuve par les parties en litige dans un contexte criminel. L’accusé peut être de deux types – innocent ou coupable – et il sait de quel type il est. Mais ni le tribunal ni le procureur n’ont cette information. Le tribunal ne va condamner l’accusé que si la probabilité a posteriori de culpabilité de l’accusé est plus grande qu’une certaine valeur seuil – la norme de la preuve. Cette probabilité dépend des preuves présentées par les parties au tribunal. La production de la preuve est un processus stochastique coûteux. Ce modèle de production de la preuve est utilisé pour analyser le choix optimal de la preuve et de la punition. Comme on pouvait s’y attendre, on peut montrer que la norme optimale de la preuve s’accroît à proportion que s’accroît le coût de condamner un innocent et décroît à proportion que s’accroît le coût de l’acquittement d’un coupable. Ce qui est plus surprenant, on peut montrer que l’accroissement de la punition infligée à un accusé trouvé coupable peut accroître les probabilités à la fois de condamnation et d’acquittement non fondés.

Suggested Citation

  • Okan Yilankaya, 2002. "A model of evidence production and optimal standard of proof and penalty in criminal trials," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 35(2), pages 385-409, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:35:y:2002:i:2:p:385-409
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-5982.00136
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5982.00136
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1540-5982.00136?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2014. "In Dubio Pro Reo. Behavioral Explanations of Pro-defendant Bias in Procedures," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 60(3), pages 554-580.
    2. Murat C Mungan & Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2020. "Accuracy and Preferences for Legal Error," Working Papers hal-04229266, HAL.
    3. Lando Henrik, 2009. "Prevention of Crime and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 33-52, January.
    4. Robin Christmann, 2023. "Plea bargaining and investigation effort: inquisitorial criminal procedure as a three-player game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 497-532, December.
    5. Schwarz Mordechai E., 2012. "Subgame Perfect Plea Bargaining in Biform Judicial Contests," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 297-330, September.
    6. Gorkem Celik, 2015. "Implementation by Gradual Revelation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 271-296, June.
    7. Guerra Alice & Luppi Barbara & Parisi Francesco, 2019. "Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-19, January.
    8. Luke M. Froeb & Bernhard Ganglmair & Steven Tschantz, 2016. "Adversarial Decision Making: Choosing between Models Constructed by Interested Parties," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 527-548.
    9. Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, 2013. "Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 395-411, June.
    10. Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, 2009. "Better that X guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer," Working Papers 168, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2009.
    11. Matteo Rizzolli, 2016. "Adjudication: Type-I and Type-II Errors," CERBE Working Papers wpC15, CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:35:y:2002:i:2:p:385-409. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5982 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.