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Inflation, taxes, and the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy by use of a game of chicken

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  • Richard C. Barnett

Abstract

In this study some of the consequences of an uncertain policy struggle (‘game of chicken’) between independent taxing agencies (a monetary and a fiscal authority) are examined. We show that policy uncertainty may improve upon regimes where there is no uncertainty and one agency succeeds in implementing a low‐tax policy at the expense of the other agency. An uncertain tax policy never dominates a fully coordinated tax policy, but it can move average tax rates in the right direction. In this sense, the game of chicken between agencies can be beneficial and can compensate for the lack of a specific coordinating administration. (JEL Classification: E61) Inflation, fiscalité et la coordination des politiques fiscale et monétaire par l'utilisation du ‘jeu du premier qui se dégonfle.’ Cette étude examine certaines conséquences d'un combat politique incertain (jeu du premier qui se dégonfle) entre des agences indépendantes de taxation (une autorité monétaire et une autorité fiscale). On montre que l'incertitude politique peut constituer un régime qui fait mieux que des régimes où il n\'y a pas d'incertitude et où une agence réussit à mettre en place une politique de faible imposition au dépens de l'autre agence. Une politique de taxation incertaine ne domine jamais une politique de taxation pleinement coordonnée, mais elle peut déplacer les taux moyen d'imposition dans la bonne direction. En ce sens, le \′jeu du premier qui se dégonfle\' entre agences peut être bénéfique et peut compenser pour le manque de coordination spécifiquement gérée.

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  • Richard C. Barnett, 2001. "Inflation, taxes, and the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy by use of a game of chicken," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(1), pages 82-99, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:34:y:2001:i:1:p:82-99
    DOI: 10.1111/0008-4085.00063
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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Libich & Dat Thanh Nguyen & Petr Stehlík, 2011. "Monetary Exit Strategy and Fiscal Spillovers," CAMA Working Papers 2011-04, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    2. Jan Libich & Petr Stehlik, 2008. "Fiscal Rigidity In A Monetary Union: The Calvo Timing And Beyond," CAMA Working Papers 2008-22, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    3. Brent Hueth & Maro Ibarburu & James Kliebenstein, 2005. "Business Organization and Coordination in Marketing Specialty Hogs: A Comparative Analysis of Two Firms from Iowa," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 05-wp415, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
    4. Jan Libich & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Petr Stehlik, 2007. "Monetary And Fiscal Policy Interaction With Various Degrees And Types Of Commitment," CAMA Working Papers 2007-21, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    5. Libich, Jan & Nguyen, Dat Thanh & Stehlík, Petr, 2015. "Monetary exit and fiscal spillovers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 184-206.
    6. Andrew HUGHES HALLETT & Jan LIBICH & Petr STEHLÍK, 2014. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction with Various Degrees of Commitment," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 64(1), pages 2-29, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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