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A model of substitution of non‐tariff barriers for tariffs

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  • Zhihao Yu

Abstract

In this paper some coherent explanations are suggested for tariff reductions and substitution of non‐tariff barriers for tariffs, taking into account both organized special interests and unorganized consumer interests. The focus is on how the presence of informed consumers affects the political equilibrium choice of trade policy. Three effects are identified that interact with each other as an incumbent government substitutes a NTB for a tariff, and, among other things, it is found that an increase in foreign competition will not cause the government to substitute NTBs for tariffs, but a rise in the government's valuation of political contribution might do so. JEL Classification: F13, D72 Ce mémoire propose des explications cohérentes de la réduction des droits de douane et de la substitution de barrières non‐tarifaires (BNT) pour les droits de douane dans un cadre d'analyse qui tient compte des groupes d'intérêt organisés et de la désorganisation des groupes de consommateurs. L'analyse insiste sur l'impact de consommateurs informés sur les choix politiques qui sous‐tendent la politique commerciale. Le mémoire identifie trois effets (effet de bienêtre social, effet de lobbying, effet d'information) qui jouent au moment où un gouvernement substitue une barrière non‐tarifaire à un droit de douane. On montre, entre autres choses, qu'un accroissement de la concurrence étrangère n'engendre pas de substitution de BNT pour un droit de douane, mais qu'un accroissement de la valeur accordée aux contributions électorales peut fort bien avoir cet effet.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhihao Yu, 2000. "A model of substitution of non‐tariff barriers for tariffs," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(4), pages 1069-1090, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:33:y:2000:i:4:p:1069-1090
    DOI: 10.1111/0008-4085.00054
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    Cited by:

    1. Kjersti Nes & K. Aleks Schaefer, 2022. "Retaliatory use of public standards in trade," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(1), pages 142-161, January.
    2. Eyal Ronen, 2017. "Tariffs and non-tariff measures: substitutes or complements. A cross-country analysis," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 48(1), pages 45-72.
    3. Gründler, Klaus & Hillman, Arye L., 2021. "Ambiguous protection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    4. Garred, Jason, 2018. "The persistence of trade policy in China after WTO accession," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 130-142.
    5. Kuenzel, David J., 2020. "WTO tariff commitments and temporary protection: Complements or substitutes?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    6. David J. Kuenzel, 2023. "Non‐tariff measures: What's tariffs got to do with it?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(1), pages 133-163, February.
    7. Zhaohui Niu & Chris Milner & Saileshsingh Gunessee & Chang Liu, 2020. "Are nontariff measures and tariffs substitutes? Some panel data evidence," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 408-428, May.
    8. Michael E. S. Hoffman, 2005. "Political and Public Finance Motives for Tariffs," International Trade 0510016, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Jie Li & Xianhai Huang, 2013. "When to Initiate an International Vertical Merger? The Impact of Negative Demand Shock," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(7), pages 843-860, July.
    10. Chuc Dinh Nguyen & Kazunobu Hayakawa, 2024. "The Substitution Effect of Preferential Tariffs on Nontariff Measures: Evidence from Vietnam," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 62(1), pages 87-103, March.
    11. Jie Li & Xiaohui Xu & Jing Lu, 2015. "Negotiation over Intellectual Property Rights Protection in a Mixed Market," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(4), pages 759-775, November.
    12. M. Mahdi Ghodsi, 2018. "Determinants of specific trade concerns raised on technical barriers to trade EU versus non-EU," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 45(1), pages 83-128, February.
    13. Dapeng Cai & Jie Li, 2012. "Quid pro quo and the enforcement of intellectual property rights protection: A bargaining approach," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(6), pages 755-772, December.
    14. Beverelli, Cosimo & Boffa, Mauro & Keck, Alexander, 2014. "Trade policy substitution: Theory and evidence from Specific Trade Concerns," WTO Staff Working Papers ERSD-2014-18, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    15. Cai Dapeng & Li Jie, 2014. "Subsidization And Bargaining In Mixed Oligopolies," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(4), pages 358-373, October.
    16. Kagitani, Koichi & Harimaya, Kozo, 2015. "Safeguards and voluntary export restraints under the World Trade Organization," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 29-41.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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