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The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry

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Author Info
Crocker, Keith J
Snow, Arthur
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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 94 (1986)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 321-44
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:94:y:1986:i:2:p:321-44

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  1. Mattias K. Polborn & Mike Hoy & Asha Sadanand, 1999. "Information and Dynamic Adjustment in Life Insurance Markets," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9911, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Reimund Schwarze & Thomas Wein, 2005. "Is the Market Classification of Risk Always Efficient? - Evidence from German Third Party Motor Insurance," Working Paper Series in Economics 3, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Keith J. Crocker & John R. Moran, 2002. "Contracting with Limited Commitment: Evidence from Employment-Based Health Insurance Contracts," Center for Policy Research Working Papers 45, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University. [Downloadable!]
  4. M. Dahchour & G. Dionne, 2002. "Pricing of Automobile Insurance Under Asymmetric Information : a Study on Panel Data," THEMA Working Papers 2002-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  5. G. Dionne & M. Maurice & J. Pinquet & C. Vanasse, 2001. "The Role of Memory in Long-Term Contracting with Moral Hazard : Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance," THEMA Working Papers 2001-11, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba & Casey Rothschild, 2006. "Redistribution by Insurance Market Regulation: Analyzing a Ban on Gender-Based Retirement Annuities," NBER Working Papers 12205, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Eldar Beiseitov & Jeffrey D. Kubik & John R. Moran, 2004. "Social Interaction and the Health Insurance Choices of the Elderly," Center for Policy Research Working Papers 58, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Dionne, G. & Michaud, P.C. & Dahchour, M., 2004. "Separating moral hazard from adverse selection in automobile insurance : longitudinal evidence from France," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Jeffrey I. Bernstein, 1992. "Information Spillovers, Margins, Scale and Scope: With an Application to Canadian Life Insurance," NBER Working Papers 3979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Hoy, M. & Witt, J., 2005. "Welfare Effects of Banning Genetic Information in the Life Insurance Market: The Case of BRCA 1/2 Genes," Working Papers 2005-5, University of Guelph, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jason Strauss & Aidan Michael Hollis, 2007. "Insurance Markets When Firms Are Asymmetrically Informed: A Note," Working Papers 2007-18, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 30 Nov 2007. [Downloadable!]
  12. Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1995. "The Causes and Consequences of Rate Regulation in the Auto Insurance Industry," NBER Working Papers 5245, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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