1. Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
2. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr., 2003. "Why Is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Stephen Ansolobehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder, 2003. "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?," NBER Working Papers 9409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1998. "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," CRSP working papers 349, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
   • Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1996. "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress:Theory And Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 126, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State. [Downloadable!]
   • Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, . "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services', Political Action Committees," CRSP working papers 465, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
5. Baron, David P, 1989. "Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 45-72, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Bronars, Stephen G & Lott, John R, Jr, 1997. "Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 317-50, October.
7. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-73, October.

Cited by:
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1. Federico Cingano & Paolo Pinotti, 2009. "Politicians at work. The private returns and social costs of political connections," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 709, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
2. Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler, 2008. "Corporate Campaign Contributions as a Predictor for Abnormal Stock Returns after Presidential Elections," Working Papers 2008-18, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
3. Pande, Rohini, 2007. "Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 6273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Pande, Rohini, 2007. "Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries," Working Paper Series rwp07-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
5. Nowook Park & Rohini Somanathan, 2004. "Patronage in public administration: Presidential connections, position assignments and the performance of Korean public prosecutors, 1992-2000," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-02, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
6. Brian Knight, 2004. "Are Policy Platforms Capitalized into Equity Prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election," NBER Working Papers 10333, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Knight*, Brian, 2007. "Are policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 389-409, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Knight, Brian, 2006. "Are policy platforms capitalized into equity prices? Evidence from the Bush/Gore 2000 Presidential Election," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 751-773, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Philip Hersch & Jeffry Netter & Christopher Pope, 2008. "Do Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures by Firms Create “Political” Capital?," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(4), pages 395-405, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Stijn Claessens & Erik Feijen & Luc Laeven, 2006. "Does Campaign Finance imply Political Favors?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-002/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
9. Erik Snowberg & Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2006. "Party Influence in Congress and the Economy," NBER Working Papers 12751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Rau, P. Raghavendra & Aris, Stouraitis, 2008. "The helping hand, the lazy hand, or the grabbing hand? Central vs. local government shareholders in publicly listed firms in China," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-11, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]