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Corporate Income Tax Evasion and Managerial Preferences

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  • David Joulfaian

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of managerial preferences in shaping corporate income tax evasion. Using noncompliance with the personal income tax as a measure of taste for evasion, the empirical results from a sample of corporate income tax returns show that managerial preferences play an important role in determining noncompliance with the corporate income tax. Basic sample tabulations show that, when compared to compliant firms, noncompliant firms are three times more likely to be managed by executives who have understated personal taxes. In addition, results from multivariate analyses suggest that the amount of underreported income is significantly higher in the presence of such executives. © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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  • David Joulfaian, 2000. "Corporate Income Tax Evasion and Managerial Preferences," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(4), pages 698-701, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:82:y:2000:i:4:p:698-701
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    File URL: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/rest.2000.82.4.698
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