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The limits of ex post implementation without transfers

Author

Listed:
  • Feng, Tangren

    (Department of Decision Sciences and IGIER, Bocconi University)

  • Niemeyer, Axel

    (Department of Economics, University of Bonn)

  • Wu, Qinggong

    (Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

Abstract

We study ex post implementation in collective decision problems where monetary transfers cannot be used. We find that deterministic ex post implementation is impossible if the underlying environment is neither almost an environment with private values nor almost one with common values. Thus, desirable properties of ex post implementation such as informational robustness become difficult to achieve when preference interdependence and preference heterogeneity are both present in the environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Feng, Tangren & Niemeyer, Axel & Wu, Qinggong, 2023. "The limits of ex post implementation without transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:4915
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 2002. "An Efficient Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1199-1212, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ex post implementation; interdependent values; non-transferable utility; mechanism design; collective decision-making; informational robustness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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