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Strategic defense and attack of series systems when agents move sequentially

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  • Kjell Hausken

Abstract

In the September 11, 2001, attack the defender moved first with a weak defense, and the attacker moved second with an overwhelming attack. One alternative is that the attacker moves first by announcing an attack, while the defender moves second to defend against that attack. Third, two ships in a simultaneous encounter cannot take the opponent's strategy as given. For a series system that the defender prefers should operate reliably, and the attacker prefers should operate unreliably, this article demonstrates that these three scenarios cause crucially different recommendations for defense and attack investments. For example, the defender prefers to move first rather than participate in a simultaneous game in a series system with two components. In contrast, an advantaged attacker in a series system prefers the simultaneous game since it does not want to expose which components are to be attacked. When the defender is advantaged in a series system, its first move deters the attacker. Deterrence is not possible in simultaneous games. When equally matched, both agents prefer to avoid the uncertain and costly simultaneous game that causes high investment costs. The results for the defender (attacker) in a parallel system are equivalent to the results for the attacker (defender) in a series system.

Suggested Citation

  • Kjell Hausken, 2011. "Strategic defense and attack of series systems when agents move sequentially," IISE Transactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(7), pages 483-504.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:uiiexx:v:43:y:2011:i:7:p:483-504
    DOI: 10.1080/0740817X.2010.541178
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Xing Gao & Weijun Zhong & Shue Mei, 2013. "Information Security Investment When Hackers Disseminate Knowledge," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 352-368, December.
    2. Hausken, Kjell, 2010. "Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply on Comment," MPRA Paper 25497, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Oct 2010.
    3. Zhang, Chi & Ramirez-Marquez, José Emmanuel & Wang, Jianhui, 2015. "Critical infrastructure protection using secrecy – A discrete simultaneous game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 242(1), pages 212-221.
    4. Rui Peng & Di Wu & Mengyao Sun & Shaomin Wu, 2021. "An attack-defense game on interdependent networks," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 72(10), pages 2331-2341, October.
    5. Qingqing Zhai & Rui Peng & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Defender–Attacker Games with Asymmetric Player Utilities," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(2), pages 408-420, February.
    6. Bose, Gautam & Konrad, Kai A., 2020. "Devil take the hindmost: Deflecting attacks to other defenders," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    7. Brian Lunday & Hanif Sherali, 2012. "Network interdiction to minimize the maximum probability of evasion with synergy between applied resources," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 411-442, July.
    8. Vineet M. Payyappalli & Jun Zhuang & Victor Richmond R. Jose, 2017. "Deterrence and Risk Preferences in Sequential Attacker–Defender Games with Continuous Efforts," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(11), pages 2229-2245, November.
    9. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Luo, Yi, 2014. "Incorporating risk seeking attitude into defense strategy," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 104-109.
    10. González-Ortega, Jorge & Ríos Insua, David & Cano, Javier, 2019. "Adversarial risk analysis for bi-agent influence diagrams: An algorithmic approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 273(3), pages 1085-1096.
    11. Hunt, Kyle & Zhuang, Jun, 2024. "A review of attacker-defender games: Current state and paths forward," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(2), pages 401-417.
    12. Kjell Hausken, 2018. "Proactivity and Retroactivity of Firms and Information Sharing of Hackers," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(01), pages 1-30, March.
    13. Liang, Liang & Chen, Jingxian & Siqueira, Kevin, 2020. "Revenge or continued attack and defense in defender–attacker conflicts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(3), pages 1180-1190.
    14. Kjell Hausken, 2012. "Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply 1 to comment 1," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 525-531, October.
    15. Nageswara S. V. Rao & Chris Y. T. Ma & Fei He & David K. Y. Yau & Jun Zhuang, 2018. "Cyber–Physical Correlation Effects in Defense Games for Large Discrete Infrastructures," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-24, July.

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