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Assets, Attributes and Ownership

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Author Info
Kirsten Foss, Nicolai Foss

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Abstract

The notion of full asset ownership is important in economics, for example, in recent work on the boundaries of the firm. Much of this work has been taken up with the issue why it matters who owns an asset. However, recognizing that assets have multiple attributes, and that these may be subject to capture in a world of positive measurement and enforcement costs, implies that the notion of full asset ownership is problematic. New property rights theorists sidestep these issues by implicitly assuming that residual rights of control are perfectly enforced (i.e. full asset ownership obtains). We discuss the notion of property rights and ownership in a setting characterized by positive costs of enforcement, and suggest that in such a setting, the new property rights model is a part of a more overarching perspective, which also includes older contributions to property rights economics.

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Article provided by Taylor and Francis Journals in its journal International Journal of the Economics of Business.

Volume (Year): 8 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 19-37
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Handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:8:y:2001:i:1:p:19-37

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Related research
Keywords: Ownership Property Rights Economic Organization;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  5. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1846, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  6. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power In A Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
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  9. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Unforseen Contingencies, Property Rights, and Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1796, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  11. Umbeck, John, 1981. "Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution of Property Rights," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 38-59, January.
  12. Barzel, Yoram, 1982. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 27-48, April.
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  14. Kreps, David M, 1996. "Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 561-95.
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  17. Demsetz, Harold, 1996. "The core disagreement between Pigou, the profession, and Coase in the analyses of the externality question," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 565-579, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jongeneel, Roel & Polman, Nico & Slangen, Louis, 2005. "Why Are Farmers Going Multifunctional?," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24585, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jongeneel, Roel & Polman, Nico & Slangen, Louis, 2005. "Explaining the Changing Institutional Organisation of Dutch Farms: The Role of Farmer's Attitude, Advisory Network and Structural Factors," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24526, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  3. Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein, 2005. "The Theory of the Firm and Its Critics A Stocktaking and Assessment," DRUID Working Papers 05-03, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies. [Downloadable!]
  4. Michel Renault & Yvan Renou, 2007. "Processus d'individuation, éthique et pragmatisme. A la recherche de fondements théoriques pour appréhender la firme partenariale," Post-Print halshs-00202148_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  5. Geoffrey M. Hodgson, 2002. "The Legal Nature of the Firm and the Myth of the Firm-Market Hybrid," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 37-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss, 2000. "Theoretical isolation in contract theory: suppressing margins and entrepreneurship," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 7(3), pages 313-339, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Jongeneel, R. & Slangen, L.H.G., 2005. "Explaining the Changing Institutional Organisation of Dutch Farms: The Role of Farmer's Attitude, Advisory Network and Structural Factors," 94th Seminar, April 9-10, 2005, Ashford, UK 24441, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  8. Foss, Nicolai J. & Klein, Peter G. & Kor, Yasemin Y. & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2006. "Entrepreneurship, Subjectivism, and the Resource-Based View: Towards a New Synthesis," Working Papers 06-0121, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business. [Downloadable!]
  9. Nicolai J. Foss, 2002. "'Coase vs Hayek': Economic Organization and the Knowledge Economy," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 9-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Nicolai Foss & Kirsten Foss & Peter G. Klein & Sandra K. Klein, . "Heterogeneous Capital, Entrepreneurship, and Economic Organization," IVS/CBS Working Papers 2002-02, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy, Copenhagen Business School. [Downloadable!]
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