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What determines people's decisions whether or not to report sick?

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  • Daniel Eek
  • Klas Rikner

Abstract

Swedish employees who are temporarily absent from work are compensated for the loss of income from the governmentally regulated sickness insurance. During the 1990s, when the societal costs for covering sickness absence raised dramatically, the sickness insurance underwent several changes, which raised questions about how people reacted to the changes made. This article is based on a survey where individuals were asked several questions about whether they would go to work or report sick, given that they actually felt ill. Respondents were asked the same questions under different hypothetical compensations. The results indicated strong effects of factors related to the financial loss of being absent on the propensity to report sick.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Eek & Klas Rikner, 2005. "What determines people's decisions whether or not to report sick?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(5), pages 533-543.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:37:y:2005:i:5:p:533-543
    DOI: 10.1080/0003684042000319163
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brown, Sarah & Sessions, John G, 1996. "The Economics of Absence: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 23-53, March.
    2. R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 179-199.
    3. Goetze, Linda & Glover, T F & Biswas, B, 1993. "The Effects of Group Size and Income on Contributions to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 407-414, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lindbeck, Assar & Persson, Mats, 2006. "A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms," Working Paper Series 659, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.

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