IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spt/apfiba/v14y2024i3f14_3_2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Causality between Analysts’ Recommendations and Corporate M&As

Author

Listed:
  • Ching-Chih Wu
  • Tung-Hsiao Yang

Abstract

This study examines the role of analysts' recommendations in mergers and acquisitions (M&As), focusing on their impact on payment methods and acquirers' long-term performance. The findings reveal that acquirers with strong buy or buy recommendations are more likely to use 100% stock payment, consistent with the overvaluation hypothesis. Conversely, those with strong sell or sell recommendations tend to prefer cash payment. Notably, acquirers with higher recommendation scores exhibit better long-term market performance. This finding suggests that analysts' recommendations before M&A announcements do not fully incorporate the deal's potential impact on long-term value creation. Moreover, acquirers with buy recommendations experience significantly lower long-term returns, highlighting the disconnect between analysts' recommendations and long-term performance. These findings contribute to understanding the information content and limitations of analysts' recommendations in the M&A context. Â JEL classification numbers: G34, G24, G14.

Suggested Citation

  • Ching-Chih Wu & Tung-Hsiao Yang, 2024. "The Causality between Analysts’ Recommendations and Corporate M&As," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 14(3), pages 1-2.
    • Handle: RePEc:spt:apfiba:v:14:y:2024:i:3:f:14_3_2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.scienpress.com/Upload/JAFB%2fVol%2014_3_2.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Womack, Kent L, 1996. "Do Brokerage Analysts' Recommendations Have Investment Value?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 137-167, March.
    2. Uysal, Vahap B. & Kedia, Simi & Panchapagesan, Venkatesh, 2008. "Geography and acquirer returns," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 256-275, April.
    3. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-686.
    4. Hassan Tehranian & Mengxing Zhao & Julie L. Zhu, 2014. "Can Analysts Analyze Mergers?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(4), pages 959-979, April.
    5. Michael C. Jensen, 2005. "Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 34(1), Spring.
    6. Minkwan Ahn & Michael Drake & Hangsoo Kyung & Han Stice, 2019. "The role of the business press in the pricing of analysts’ recommendation revisions," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 341-392, March.
    7. Brown, David T & Ryngaert, Michael D, 1991. "The Mode of Acquisition in Takeovers: Taxes and Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(2), pages 653-669, June.
    8. Alexander T. Nicolai & Ann‐Christine Schulz & Thomas W. Thomas, 2010. "What Wall Street Wants – Exploring the Role of Security Analysts in the Evolution and Spread of Management Concepts," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 162-189, January.
    9. Emilie R. Feldman, 2016. "Corporate spinoffs and analysts' coverage decisions: The implications for diversified firms," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(7), pages 1196-1219, July.
    10. Fogarty, Timothy J. & Rogers, Rodney K., 2005. "Financial analysts' reports: an extended institutional theory evaluation," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 331-356, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thabang Mokoaleli-Mokoteli & Richard J. Taffler & Vineet Agarwal, 2009. "Behavioural Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Analyst Stock Recommendations," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3-4), pages 384-418.
    2. Pieter de Jong & Lakshmi Goel, 2016. "The influence of security analysts on CEO pay cuts," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 13(1), pages 26-52, February.
    3. Thabang Mokoaleli‐Mokoteli & Richard J. Taffler & Vineet Agarwal, 2009. "Behavioural Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Analyst Stock Recommendations," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3‐4), pages 384-418, April.
    4. Lee, Kenneth & Manochin, Melina, 2021. "Sell-side equity analysts and equity sales: A study of interaction," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(5).
    5. Régis BRETON & Sébastien GALANTI & Christophe HURLIN & Anne-Gaël VAUBOURG, 2011. "Does the firm-analyst relationship matter in explaining analysts' earnings forecast errors?," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 469, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    6. Linda Allen & Julapa Jagtiani & Stavros Peristiani & Anthony Saunders, 2002. "The role of bank advisors in mergers and acquisitions," Staff Reports 143, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    7. Azzi, Sarah & Bird, Ron, 2005. "Prophets during boom and gloom downunder," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 337-367, February.
    8. Lee, Kenneth & Manochin, Melina, 2021. "Sell-side equity analysts and equity sales: a study of interaction," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 108953, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Krigman, Laurie & Shaw, Wayne H. & Womack, Kent L., 2001. "Why do firms switch underwriters?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2-3), pages 245-284, May.
    10. Bryan Kelly & Alexander Ljungqvist, 2012. "Testing Asymmetric-Information Asset Pricing Models," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(5), pages 1366-1413.
    11. Chen Su, 2023. "The price impact of analyst revisions and the state of the economy: Evidence around the world," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 887-930, November.
    12. Chih-Hsiang Chang, 2017. "Exploring stock recommenders’ behavior and recommendation receivers’ sophistication," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 41(1), pages 1-26, January.
    13. Lee, Charles M.C. & So, Eric C., 2017. "Uncovering expected returns: Information in analyst coverage proxies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 331-348.
    14. Petya Platikanova, 2023. "The Real Effects of Analyst Research Quality: Evidence from the Adoption of the Broker Protocol," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 33(3), pages 237-261, September.
    15. R. Bellando & Z. Ben Braham & S. Galanti, 2016. "The profitability of financial analysts’ recommendations: evidence from an emerging market," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(46), pages 4410-4418, October.
    16. Degeorge, François & Derrien, Francois & Womack, Kent L, 2004. "Quid Pro Quo in IPOs: Why Book-Building is Dominating Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4462, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Jeffrey Hobbs & Vivek Singh, 2015. "A comparison of buy‐side and sell‐side analysts," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 24(1), pages 42-51, January.
    18. Palomino, Frederic & Renneboog, Luc & Zhang, Chendi, 2009. "Information salience, investor sentiment, and stock returns: The case of British soccer betting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 368-387, June.
    19. Xiaojing Meng, 2015. "Analyst Reputation, Communication, and Information Acquisition," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 119-173, March.
    20. Cheolwoo Lee, 2013. "Analyst firm parent–subsidiary relationship and conflict of interest: evidence from IPO recommendations," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 53(3), pages 763-789, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mergers and acquisitions; Analysts' recommendations; Payment methods; Information quality; Overvaluation hypothesis.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spt:apfiba:v:14:y:2024:i:3:f:14_3_2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Eleftherios Spyromitros-Xioufis (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.scienpress.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.