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Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints

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  • Karol Flores-Szwagrzak

    (University of Southern Denmark)

Abstract

A resource available in different types is to be distributed or redistributed among agents differing in their ability to consume these types. Preferences over consumption levels are not observable but known to be single-peaked. We identify the only strategy-proof and efficient allocation rule satisfying a formulation of “fair net trades” (Schmeidler and Vind in Econometrica 40(4):637–642, 1972). This rule coincides with the “generalized uniform rule” (Thomson in Axiomatic analysis of generalized economies with single-peaked preferences, 1995a) when the resource is available in a single type and with the “egalitarian rule” (Bochet et al. in J Econ Theory 148:535–562, 2013) when there are no individual endowments. Moreover, it coincides with the “uniform rule” (Sprumont in Econometrica 59(2):509–519, 1991) when the resource is available in a single type and there are no individual endowments. This rule belongs to a new class of group strategy-proof rules. Our analysis provides a unified treatment of the applications in Bochet et al. (Theor Econ 7:395–423, 2012, J Econ Theory 148:535–562, 2013).

Suggested Citation

  • Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, 2017. "Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 109-131, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-015-0921-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0921-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bochet, Olivier & İlkılıç, Rahmi & Moulin, Hervé, 2013. "Egalitarianism under earmark constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 535-562.
    2. Thomson, William, 1995. "Population-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 229-246, March.
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    8. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O. & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.
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      • SCHMEIDLER, David & VIND, Karl, 1972. "Fair net trades," LIDAM Reprints CORE 131, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Cited by:

    1. Chandramouli, Shyam & Sethuraman, Jay, 2017. "Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 111-118.

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