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Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods

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Author Info
Lars-Gunnar Svensson () (Department of Economics, Lund University, P.O. Box 7082, SE-22007 of Lund, Sweden)
Abstract

Strategy-proof allocation of a finite number of indivisible goods among a finite number of individuals is considered. The main result is that in a pure distributional case, a mechanism is strategy-proof, nonbossy and neutral if and only if it is serially dictatorial. If the indivisible goods are initially owned by the individuals, a mechanism is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto consistent if and only if it is the core mechanism.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 16 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 557-567
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:557-567

Note: Received: 15 September 1997/Accepted: 12 May 1998
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  1. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Domains of Social Choice Functions on which Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent," ISER Discussion Paper 0668, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2006. "Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Fairness," Working Papers 2006:10, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  3. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Kidney Exchange," Game Theory and Information 0308002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2005. "Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-33, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP). [Downloadable!]
  5. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Larsson, Bo, 2002. "Strategy-Proofness, Core, and Sequential Trade," Working Papers 2002:14, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 09 May 2003.
  6. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2002. "Efficient Priority Rules," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 554.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Game Theory and Information 0408001, EconWPA, revised 16 Feb 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2004. "Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages," Working Papers 2004:8, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Moulin, Herve & Bogomolnaia, Anna, 2001. "Random Matching under Dichotomous Preferences," Working Papers 2001-03, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Ehlers,Lars & Klaus,Bettina, 2005. "Consistent House Allocation," Research Memoranda 007, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Vito Fragnelli & Maria Erminia Marina, 2009. "Strategic Manipulations and Collusions in Knaster Procedure," AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(2), pages 143-153, July. [Downloadable!]
  12. Yuji Fujinaka & Takuma Wakayama, 2008. "Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets," ISER Discussion Paper 0727, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Feb 2009. [Downloadable!]
  13. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June. [Downloadable!]
  14. Tommy Andersson & Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2008. "Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 321-338, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Svensson , Lars-Gunnar, 2002. "Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof," Working Papers 2002:17, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Smez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," Discussion Papers 0203-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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