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Führt das Rating nach Basel II zu einer freiwilligen Umstellung der Rechnungslegung von den handelsrechtlichen GoB zu den IFRS?

Author

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  • Stefan Wielenberg

    (Leibniz Universität Hannover)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung In der Diskussion um die freiwillige Anwendung der IFRS-Standards in nicht börsenorientierten mittelständischen Unternehmen spielt ein Argument eine besondere Rolle: Die Umstellung auf IFRS verbessert Transparenz, Image und nicht zuletzt wichtige bilanzanalytische Kennzahlen des Unternehmens und führt daher zu einem besseren Rating und damit nach Einführung von Basel II zu günstigeren Kreditkonditionen. Dieses Argument ist aus ökonomischer Sicht zweifelhaft, da Banken und Rating-Agenturen genügend Marktmacht und Know-How besitzen sollten, um Transparenzlücken zu schließen und Bilanzpolitik zu durchschauen. Dieser Aufsatz analysiert das Umstellungsmotiv „Rating/Basel II” in einem einfachen spieltheoretischen Modell, in dem der Kreditgeber unvollständige Informationen über die Bonität des Kreditnehmers besitzt. Der Kreditnehmer bestimmt darüber, ob er dem Kreditgeber den HGB-Abschluss zur Analyse einreicht oder ob er auf IFRS umstellt. Die Analyse der Eintrittsbedingungen für die in diesem Spiel möglichen sequentiellen Gleichgewichte zeigt, dass einerseits die vollständige Beibehaltung der HGB-Rechnungslegung im Mittelstand unrealistisch ist, andererseits aber auch der Wechsel aller Unternehmen zu IFRS aus dem Motiv der Ratingverbesserung nicht zwingend erfolgen muss.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Wielenberg, 2007. "Führt das Rating nach Basel II zu einer freiwilligen Umstellung der Rechnungslegung von den handelsrechtlichen GoB zu den IFRS?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 59(6), pages 732-751, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:59:y:2007:i:6:d:10.1007_bf03371720
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03371720
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Chaney, Paul K. & Lewis, Craig M., 1995. "Earnings management and firm valuation under asymmetric information," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 319-345, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    G21; G30; M41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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