IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/revint/v4y2009i2p135-157.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Turkey and the IMF: A case study in the political economy of policy implementation

Author

Listed:
  • Ozlem Arpac
  • Graham Bird

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Ozlem Arpac & Graham Bird, 2009. "Turkey and the IMF: A case study in the political economy of policy implementation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 135-157, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:2:p:135-157
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-008-9051-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11558-008-9051-4
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11558-008-9051-4?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Allan Drazen, 2002. "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(Special i), pages 36-67.
    2. Wolfgang Mayer & Alex Mourmouras, 2004. "IMF Conditionality and the Theory of Special Interest Politics1," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 46(3), pages 400-422, September.
    3. Polak, J.J., 1991. "The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality," Princeton Studies in International Economics 184, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    4. Wolfgang Mayer & Alex Mourmouras, 2008. "IMF conditionality: An approach based on the theory of special interest politics," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 105-121, June.
    5. Edwards, Sebastian, 1989. "The international monetary fund and the developing countries: A critical evaluation," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 7-68, January.
    6. Axel Dreher, 2003. "The influence of elections on IMF programme interruptions," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(6), pages 101-120.
    7. Sebastian Edwards, 1989. "The International Monetary Fund and the Developing Countries: A Critical Evaluation," NBER Working Papers 2909, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Mr. Mohsin S. Khan & Mr. Sunil Sharma, 2001. "IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs," IMF Working Papers 2001/142, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Akyuz, Yilmaz & Boratav, Korkut, 2003. "The Making of the Turkish Financial Crisis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(9), pages 1549-1566, September.
    10. Jacques J. Polak, 1991. "The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 41, OECD Publishing.
    11. Joseph P. Joyce, 2006. "Promises Made, Promises Broken: A Model Of Imf Program Implementation," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 339-365, November.
    12. Arpac, Ozlem & Bird, Graham & Mandilaras, Alex, 2008. "Stop Interrupting: An Empirical Analysis of the Implementation of IMF Programs," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 1493-1513, September.
    13. Drazen, Allan, 2002. "Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 3562, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Pritchett, Lant, 1996. "Measuring outward orientation in LDCs: Can it be done?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 307-335, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mirko Heinzel & Andrea Liese, 2021. "Managing performance and winning trust: how World Bank staff shape recipient performance," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 625-653, July.
    2. Reinsberg, Bernhard & Kern, Andreas & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2021. "The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    3. ., 2016. "Introduction and overview: the purposes and operations of the IMF," Chapters, in: The International Monetary Fund, chapter 1, pages 1-18, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Güner, Z. Nuray & Önder, Zeynep, 2022. "Bank affiliation and discounts on closed-end funds," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    5. Göver, Zeki Tuğrul, 2018. "The Effects of the IMF’s Quota and Governance Reforms on Turkey," Bulletin of Economic Theory and Analysis, BETA Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 1-34, March.
    6. Rau-Goehring, Matthias & Reinsberg, Bernhard & Kern, Andreas, 2020. "The role of IMF conditionality for central bank independence," Working Paper Series 2464, European Central Bank.
    7. Gül Berna Özcan & Umut Gündüz, 2015. "Energy privatisations, business-politics connections and governance under political Islam," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 33(6), pages 1714-1737, December.
    8. Ruxanda Berlinschi, 2010. "Reputation concerns in aid conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 433-459, December.
    9. Kern, Andreas & Reinsberg, Bernhard & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2019. "IMF conditionality and central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 212-229.
    10. Reinsberg, Bernhard & Kern, Andreas & Rau-Goehring, Matthias, 2021. "Transforming ‘sympathetic interlocutors’ into veto players," Working Paper Series 2518, European Central Bank.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Graham Bird, 2007. "The Imf: A Bird'S Eye View Of Its Role And Operations," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 683-745, September.
    2. Arpac, Ozlem & Bird, Graham & Mandilaras, Alex, 2008. "Stop Interrupting: An Empirical Analysis of the Implementation of IMF Programs," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 1493-1513, September.
    3. Glen Biglaiser & Karl DeRouen, 2011. "How soon is now? The effects of the IMF on economic reforms in Latin America," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 189-213, July.
    4. Dreher, Axel, 2006. "IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 769-788, May.
    5. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati & Samuel Brazys, 2023. "Does cultural diversity hinder the implementation of IMF-supported programs? An empirical investigation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 87-116, January.
    6. James Vreeland, 2006. "IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 359-378, December.
    7. Calliope Spanou, 2016. "Policy conditionality, structural adjustment and the domestic policy system. Conceptual framework and research agenda," RSCAS Working Papers 2016/60, European University Institute.
    8. Graham Bird, 2008. "The implementation of IMF programs: A conceptual framework," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 41-64, March.
    9. Axel Dreher, 2009. "IMF conditionality: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.
    10. Molly Bauer & Cesi Cruz & Benjamin Graham, 2012. "Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 33-58, March.
    11. Glen Biglaiser & Hoon Lee & Joseph Staats, 2016. "The effects of the IMF on expropriation of foreign firms," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 1-23, March.
    12. Graham Bird, 2003. "The Implementation of IMF Programmes: A Conceptual Framework and a Policy Agenda," School of Economics Discussion Papers 1003, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    13. Zaki, Mokhlis Y., 2001. "IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs and their Critics: Evidence from the Recent Experience of Egypt," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1867-1883, November.
    14. Morris Goldstein, 2017. "IMF Structural Programs," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: TRADE CURRENCIES AND FINANCE, chapter 16, pages 553-638, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    15. Bernhard Reinsberg & Thomas Stubbs & Alexander Kentikelenis, 2022. "Compliance, defiance, and the dependency trap: International Monetary Fund program interruptions and their impact on capital markets," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1022-1041, October.
    16. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura & Dreher, Axel, 2011. "Read my lips: The role of information transmission in multilateral reform design," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 86-98, May.
    17. Ulrich Fritsche, 1999. "Konzeptionelle Schwächen von IWF-Stabilisierungsprogrammen im Kontext der Asienkrise," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 68(1), pages 110-117.
    18. Armenia ANDRONICEANU & Gurgen OHANYAN, 2015. "Cooperation between European Governments and the IMF: Conditionality Impact on Employment within the EU," REVISTA DE MANAGEMENT COMPARAT INTERNATIONAL/REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 16(3), pages 324-334, July.
    19. Ostry, Jonathan D. & Jeanne, Olivier & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," CEPR Discussion Papers 7022, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Morris Goldstein, 2001. "IMF Structural Conditionality: How Much is Too Much?," Working Paper Series WP01-4, Peterson Institute for International Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    IMF programs; Conditionality; Implementation; Turkey; Political economy of implementation; F33; E61; E65;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:2:p:135-157. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.