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Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning

Author

Listed:
  • Vladimir Karamychev

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam
    Tinbergen Institute)

  • Bauke Visser

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam
    Tinbergen Institute)

Abstract

We study Sender-optimal signaling equilibria with cheap talk and money-burning. Under general assumptions, the Sender never uses money-burning to reveal all states, but always wants to garble information for at least some states. With quadratic preferences and any log-concave density of the states, optimal communication is garbled for all states: money-burning, if used at all, is used to adjust pooling intervals. This is illustrated by studying in depth the well-known uniform-quadratic case. We also show how the presence of a cost of being “caught unprepared” that gives rise to a small change in a common assumption on the Receiver’s utility function makes full revelation through money-burning Sender-optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Vladimir Karamychev & Bauke Visser, 2017. "Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 813-850, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0558-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-016-0558-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hongyi, 2021. "Relational communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
    2. Sadakane, Hitoshi, 2023. "Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    3. Bijkerk, Suzanne H. & Karamychev, Vladimir & Swank, Otto H., 2018. "When words are not enough," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 294-314.
    4. Kuvalekar, Aditya & Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2022. "Goodwill in communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    5. Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    6. Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2018.
    7. Hitoshi Sadakane, 2017. "Multistage Information Transmission with Voluntary Monetary Transfer," ISER Discussion Paper 1006rr, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jan 2018.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cheap talk; Money burning; Persuasion; Optimal equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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