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A new solution to the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims

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  • Diego Dominguez
  • William Thomson

Abstract

For the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, we consider the requirement that each agent should receive at least 1/n his claim truncated at the amount to divide, where n is the number of claimants (Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2004a). We identify two families of rules satisfying this bound. We then formulate the requirement that for each problem, the awards vector should be obtainable in two equivalent ways, (i) directly or (ii) in two steps, first assigning to each claimant his lower bound and then applying the rule to the appropriately revised problem. We show that there is only one rule satisfying this requirement. We name it the “ rule”, as it is obtained by a recursion. We then undertake a systematic investigation of the properties of the rule. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Diego Dominguez & William Thomson, 2006. "A new solution to the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 283-307, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:28:y:2006:i:2:p:283-307
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0636-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Villar, Antonio, 2004. "The Talmud rule and the securement of agents' awards," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 245-257, March.
    2. ,, 2001. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(6), pages 1157-1160, December.
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    4. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 2005. "Convergence under replication of rules to adjudicate conflicting claims," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 129-142, February.
    5. William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    6. ,, 2001. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(5), pages 1025-1031, October.
    7. Toru Hokari & William Thomson, 2003. "Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 241-261, March.
    8. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(1), pages 51-59, January.
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    11. Herrero, Carmen & Villar, Antonio, 2001. "The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 307-328, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Claims problems; Recursive rule.;

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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