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Exit, sunk costs and the selection of firms

Author

Listed:
  • Yves Richelle

    (Département d'Economique, Université Laval, Québec, G1K 7P4, CANADA)

  • Paolo G. Garella

    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna, Bologna, ITALY)

Abstract

This paper aims to identify the cost characteristics of exiting firms whenever firms are playing an infinite horizon supergame with time-invariant cost and demand functions. With more than two firms, the problem of which firms exit is quite similar to a coalition formation one. Solving this coalition formation problem, we obtain that the exiting firms are those with higher average cost functions whenever reentry is costless while, whenever reentry is unprofitable, the exiting firms are those with lower marginal (and possibly average) cost functions. Since reentry costs are typically sunk, our analysis points out that the presence of sunk costs affects not only the size (as it is well known) but also the composition of the industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Yves Richelle & Paolo G. Garella, 1999. "Exit, sunk costs and the selection of firms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(3), pages 643-670.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:13:y:1999:i:3:p:643-670
    Note: Received: April 5, 1995; revised version: January 28, 1998
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gamal Atallah, 2006. "Opportunity Costs, Competition, and Firm Selection," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(4), pages 409-430.
    2. Elena Cefis & Cristina Bettinelli & Alex Coad & Orietta Marsili, 2022. "Understanding firm exit: a systematic literature review," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 423-446, August.
    3. Jean J. Gabszewicz & Marco A. Marini & Ornella Tarola, 2015. "Alliance Formation in a Vertically Differentiated Market," DIAG Technical Reports 2015-06, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
    4. Gabszewicz, Jean J. & Marini, Marco A. & Tarola, Ornella, 2015. "Endogenous Mergers in Vertically Differentiated Markets," MPRA Paper 68318, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Exit Sunk costs · Coalition formation. ·;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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