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The seeds of success: the pivotal role of first round cooperation in public goods games

Author

Listed:
  • Mehmet Y. Gürdal

    (Boğaziçi University)

  • Orhan Torul

    (Boğaziçi University)

  • Mustafa Yahşi

    (Koç University)

Abstract

This paper examines cooperation and punishment in a public goods game in Istanbul. Unlike prior within-subject designs, we use a between-subject design with separate no-punishment and punishment conditions. This approach reveals that punishment significantly increases contributions, demonstrating the detrimental effect of having prior experience without sanctions. We highlight two critical factors—heterogeneous initial contributions across groups and how subjects update their contributions based on prior contributions and received punishment. An agent-based model verifies that the interaction between these two factors leads to a strong persistence of contributions over time. Analysis of related data from comparable cities shows similar patterns, suggesting our findings likely generalize if using a between-subject design. We conclude that overlooking within-group heterogeneity biases cross-society comparisons and subsequent policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehmet Y. Gürdal & Orhan Torul & Mustafa Yahşi, 2024. "The seeds of success: the pivotal role of first round cooperation in public goods games," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(1), pages 113-135, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jesaex:v:10:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s40881-023-00153-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s40881-023-00153-3
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods experiment; Punishment; Cooperation; Culture;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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