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Avoiding excessive deficits with fiscal coordination light

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  • Thomas Uril

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  • Thomas Uril, 2001. "Avoiding excessive deficits with fiscal coordination light," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 36(6), pages 281-285, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:intere:v:36:y:2001:i:6:p:281-285
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02930144
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Frankel, Jeffrey A & Rose, Andrew K, 1998. "The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1009-1025, July.
    2. Kletzer, Kenneth & von Hagen, Jurgen, 2000. "Monetary Union and Fiscal Federalism," CEPR Discussion Papers 2615, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Bayoumi, Tamim & Masson, Paul R, 1998. "Liability-Creating versus Non-liability-Creating Fiscal Stabilisation Policies: Ricardian Equivalence, Fiscal Stabilisation, and EMU," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1026-1045, July.
    4. Bent E. S�rensen & Oved Yosha, 1998. "International Risk Sharing and European Monetary Unification," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 327, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    5. Bas van Aarle & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans, 2002. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in the EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 229-264, January.
    6. Bohn, Henning & Inman, Robert P., 1996. "Balanced-budget rules and public deficits: evidence from the U.S. states," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 13-76, December.
    7. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.
    8. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2001. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 977-987, May.
    9. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-646, May.
    10. Barry Eichengreen & Jürgen Hagen, 1996. "Fiscal restrictions and monetary union: Rationales, repercussions, reforms," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 3-23, February.
    11. Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe From the United States," NBER Working Papers 3855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S. States," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1046-1059, November.
    13. Robert Holzmann & Yves Hervé & Roland Demmel, 1996. "The maastricht fiscal criteria: Required but ineffective?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 25-58, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sell, Friedrich L., 2003. "Die Stabilitätsprogramme der EU: Anspruch und Wirklichkeit in den ersten vier Jahren der Europäischen Währungsunion," Working Papers in Economics 2003,2, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.

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