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Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders

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  • T. Andersson
  • C. Andersson
  • A. Talman

Abstract

This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called “sets in excess demand” is introduced, and the main result demonstrates that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • T. Andersson & C. Andersson & A. Talman, 2013. "Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 211(1), pages 27-36, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:211:y:2013:i:1:p:27-36:10.1007/s10479-013-1344-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-013-1344-1
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    10. Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2016. "An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 109-149, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zhou, Yu, 2017. "A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 76-79.
    2. Andersson, Tommy & Yang, Zaifu & Zhang, Dongmo, 2015. "How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 97-99.
    3. Tierney, Ryan, 2019. "The problem of multiple commons: A market design approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 1-27.
    4. Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim, 2015. "An Approximate Auction," Working Papers 2015:19, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    5. Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2016. "An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 109-149, December.
    6. Jim Ingebretsen Carlson, 2020. "A speedy auction using approximated bidders’ preferences," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 288(1), pages 65-93, May.
    7. Andersson, Tommy & Gudmundsson, Jens & Talman, Dolf & Yang, Zaifu, 2014. "A competitive partnership formation process," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 165-177.
    8. Akiyoshi Shioura, 2017. "On the Partnership formation problem," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 2(1), pages 105-140, December.
    9. Kazuo Murota & Akiyoshi Shioura & Zaifu Yang, 2014. "Time Bounds for Iterative Auctions: A Unified Approach by Discrete Convex Analysis," Discussion Papers 14/27, Department of Economics, University of York.
    10. Pan, Lijun & Peng, Linyu & Zhou, Yu, 2020. "An assignment model with local constraints: Competitive equilibrium and ascending auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    11. De Liu & Adib Bagh, 2020. "Preserving Bidder Privacy in Assignment Auctions: Design and Measurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(7), pages 3162-3182, July.
    12. Kazuo Murota, 2016. "Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 151-273, December.
    13. Andersson, T. & Erlanson, A. & Gudmundsson, J. & Habis, H. & Ingebretsen Carlson, J. & Kratz, J., 2014. "A method for finding the maximal set in excess demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 18-20.
    14. Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim, 2016. "An Auction with Approximated Bidder Preferences - When an Auction has to be Quick," Working Papers 2016:12, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    15. Ben-Zwi, Oren, 2017. "Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 456-467.

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