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Overcoming the Divergence Between the National Fiscal Policies in the EU

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  • Mateusz Pawlak

Abstract

The article discusses the main achievements and failures of fiscal policy in the European Union. It also examines potential scenarios for EU fiscal policy. The article looks at how EU member states approach the idea of transferring fiscal policy tools from the national to the EU level. In this context, the author discusses the advantages and disadvantages of a common EU fiscal policy. The assessment of this policy is influenced by temporary factors such as a financial crisis. To offer a broader picture, the author analyzes the current economic situation in the EU and the implications of the latest financial crisis. The article also refers to past challenges, achievements and obstacles to a sustainable fiscal policy, starting from the 1970s. The methodology adopted by the author is based on an analytical approach that makes it possible to assess the collective efforts of member states to harmonize their national fiscal policies. The adopted method also makes it possible to examine the adequacy of anti-crisis measures taken by member states. In addition, the author uses a comparative method to present the diversity of political cultures, preferences and challenges stemming from the size of national economies. The results of the analysis show that the governments of individual member states are aware of the need for greater flexibility in negotiations on harmonizing fiscal policies at the EU level and are ready to reduce their fiscal sovereignty (as evidenced by the outcomes of anti-crisis summits). However, a further transfer of fiscal powers or fiscal unity do not mean that national governments will be completely deprived of control over fiscal policy, at least not for now, the author says.

Suggested Citation

  • Mateusz Pawlak, 2013. "Overcoming the Divergence Between the National Fiscal Policies in the EU," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1-2, pages 109-125.
  • Handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2013:i:1-2:p:109-125
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. C. Randall HENNING & Martin KESSLER, 2012. "Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe’s Fiscal Union," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 1-31.
    2. Jean Pisani-Ferry, 2012. "The Euro crisis and the new impossible trinity," Policy Contributions 674, Bruegel.
    3. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1984. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Brian Griffiths & Geoffrey E. Wood (ed.), Monetarism in the United Kingdom, pages 15-41, Palgrave Macmillan.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal policy; European Monetary Union; financial crisis; economic governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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