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Terrorist Spectaculars: Backlash Attacks and the Focus of Intelligence

Author

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  • Daniel G. Arce

    (School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson)

  • Todd Sandler

    (School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, tsandler@utdallas.edu)

Abstract

This article presents a signaling model of terrorist attacks, where the target government faces a trade-off from its counterterrorism responses and the backlash (counterreaction) that such responses incite. An endogenous characterization of terrorist spectaculars is specified, given a government’s counterterrorism stance and the potential for backlash attacks. In particular, spectacular attacks are pooling, rather than separating, phenomena, whereby the government cannot discern, based on past attacks, the militancy of the terrorist group. The definition for ‘‘spectacular’’ terrorist attacks is inversely related to the government’s toughness and its belief that it confronts a militant group. Policy recommendations are specified for non-event-specific intelligence in relation to the avoidance of spectacular attacks or unnecessary concessions. Intelligence must be focused on the propensity for counterterrorism to give rise to a backlash attack.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel G. Arce & Todd Sandler, 2010. "Terrorist Spectaculars: Backlash Attacks and the Focus of Intelligence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(2), pages 354-373, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:54:y:2010:i:2:p:354-373
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002709355414
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 1993. "Terrorism and signalling," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 383-397, August.
    2. Per Baltzer Overgaard, 1994. "The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(3), pages 452-478, September.
    3. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Defense Economics," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 1.
    4. B. Peter Rosendorff & Todd Sandler, 2004. "Too Much of a Good Thing?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(5), pages 657-671, October.
    5. Raymond E. Franck & Francois Melese, 2004. "Exploring the structure of terrorists' WMD decisions: A game theory approach," Defense & Security Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(4), pages 355-372, December.
    6. Joao Ricardo Faria & Daniel Arce, 2005. "Terror Support And Recruitment," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 263-273.
    7. Siqueira, Kevin & Sandler, Todd, 2007. "Terrorist backlash, terrorism mitigation, and policy delegation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1800-1815, September.
    8. Bruno S. Frey & Simon Luechinger, "undated". "How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence," IEW - Working Papers 137, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    9. Sandler, Todd & Arce, Daniel G., 2007. "Terrorism: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 25, pages 775-813, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christophe Muller & Pierre Pecher, 2021. "Terrorism, Insurgency, State Repression, and Cycles of Violence," Working Papers halshs-03134347, HAL.
    2. Michael McBride & Gary Richardson, 2012. "Stopping Suicide Attacks: Optimal Strategies and Unintended Consequences," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 413-429, October.
    3. Artyom Jelnov, 2019. "Note on terrorist factions and their interactions with governments," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(2), pages 1318-1326.
    4. Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler, 2023. "Common myths of terrorism," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 271-301, April.
    5. Aniruddha Bagchi & João Ricardo Faria & Timothy Mathews, 2019. "A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 229-248, June.
    6. Todd Sandler, 2010. "Terrorism and Policy: Introduction," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(2), pages 203-213, April.
    7. Satya P. Das & Sajal Lahiri, 2021. "Why direct counter‐terrorism measures only may fail: An analysis of direct and preventive counter‐terrorism measures," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 416-445, December.
    8. Mario Gilli & Paolo Tedeschi, 2020. "European Union and Transnational Terrorism. A Normative Analysis of Strategic Spillovers," Working Papers 437, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2020.
    9. Garcia-Alonso, Maria D.C. & Levine, Paul & Smith, Ron, 2016. "Military aid, direct intervention and counterterrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 112-135.
    10. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler, 2023. "Immigration from a terror-prone nation: destination nation’s optimal immigration and counterterrorism policies," Working Papers 2023-014, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    11. Hamid Mohtadi, 2017. "Risk‐Mitigating Policies and Adversarial Behavior: Case of Backlash," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(3), pages 459-470, March.
    12. Josiah Marineau & Henry Pascoe & Alex Braithwaite & Michael Findley & Joseph Young, 2020. "The local geography of transnational terrorism," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(3), pages 350-381, May.
    13. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036.
    14. Muhammet A Bas & Curtis S Signorino & Taehee Whang, 2014. "Knowing one’s future preferences: A correlated agent model with Bayesian updating," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(1), pages 3-34, January.
    15. Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Sandler, Todd, 2023. "Voluntary participation in a terror group and counterterrorism policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 500-513.

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