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Does Bankruptcy Reforms Enhance Firm Performances for Politically Connected Firms? Evidence from India

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  • Kousik Ganguly
  • Ajay Kumar Mishra

Abstract

Using a sample of 1,953 listed firms on the National Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2021, we investigate whether politically connected firms alter their cash holding patterns following the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) reforms introduced in 2016. We also examine the impact of changes in a firm’s cash holdings on its performance. Results show that politically connected firms reduced their cash holdings following the implementation of IBC in 2016, as new reforms better protected creditors through strict enforcement rights. We also find that politically connected firms with large amounts of cash perform poorly in the post-IBC period compared to their nonconnected peers. The results are robust after excluding the COVID-19 period and controlling for firm size, leverage, and business group affiliations. JEL Codes: G32; G34; G38

Suggested Citation

  • Kousik Ganguly & Ajay Kumar Mishra, 2024. "Does Bankruptcy Reforms Enhance Firm Performances for Politically Connected Firms? Evidence from India," Journal of Emerging Market Finance, Institute for Financial Management and Research, vol. 23(2), pages 170-196, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:emffin:v:23:y:2024:i:2:p:170-196
    DOI: 10.1177/09726527231196926
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political connections; Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC); cash holding; bankruptcy reforms; Creditors’ rights; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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