IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/anname/v670y2017i1p152-169.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Not Quite the Same

Author

Listed:
  • Martino Maggetti
  • Christian Ewert
  • Philipp Trein

Abstract

This article compares the role of regulatory intermediaries in the governance of pharmaceuticals and medical devices in Australia and Switzerland. We argue that the creation, selection, and activation of specific intermediaries depend on the organizational capacity of the regulator and on the potential of the intermediary to be captured by the target. To limit the risk of capture of intermediaries where the regulated industries are powerful, regulators tend to keep intermediaries under their control. To do so, the regulator must be well-funded and well-staffed, or supported by its political principal. However, when the target has limited capture potential, regulators will rely more heavily on externalized intermediaries. These intermediaries typically consist of transnational organizations in charge of multiple regulatory issues in several jurisdictions, and can provide unique expertise in an efficient way. Four case studies of the Australian and Swiss regulatory regimes for therapeutic products support this argument.

Suggested Citation

  • Martino Maggetti & Christian Ewert & Philipp Trein, 2017. "Not Quite the Same," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 670(1), pages 152-169, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:anname:v:670:y:2017:i:1:p:152-169
    DOI: 10.1177/0002716217691240
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0002716217691240
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0002716217691240?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur (ed.), 2004. "The Politics of Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3167.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-1127.
    3. Scherer, F.M., 2000. "The pharmaceutical industry," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 25, pages 1297-1336, Elsevier.
    4. Gianluca Baio & Laura Magazzini & Claudia Oglialoro & Fabio Pammolli & Massimo Riccaboni, 2005. "Medical Devices: Competitiveness and Impact on Public Health Expenditure," Working Papers CERM 05-2005, Competitività, Regole, Mercati (CERM).
    5. Michael M. Ting, 2011. "Organizational Capacity," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(2), pages 245-271.
    6. Jean-Pierre Galland, 2017. "Big Third-Party Certifiers and the Construction of Transnational Regulation," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 670(1), pages 263-279, March.
    7. Elman, Colin, 2005. "Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(2), pages 293-326, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Reinhard Steurer, 2013. "Disentangling governance: a synoptic view of regulation by government, business and civil society," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 46(4), pages 387-410, December.
    2. Edmund Malesky & Markus Taussig, 2019. "How Do Firms Feel About Participation by Their Peers in the Regulatory Design Process? An Online Survey Experiment Testing the Substantive Change and Spillover Mechanisms," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 4(2), pages 129-150, June.
    3. Kurt Hornschild & Stephan Raab & Jörg-Peter Weiß, 2005. "Die Medizintechnik am Standort Deutschland: Chancen und Risiken durch technologische Innovationen, Auswirkungen auf und durch das nationale Gesundheitssystem sowie potentielle Wachstumsmärkte im Ausla," DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, edition 2, volume 10, number pbk10, September.
    4. Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundationsof Banks' Risk Regulation: A Review of Literature," THEMA Working Papers 2003-46, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    5. Guriev, Sergei, 2004. "Red tape and corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 489-504, April.
    6. Hanming Fang, 2024. "Measurements, determinants, causes, and consequences of corruption: lessons from China’s anti-corruption campaign," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(1), pages 3-25, February.
    7. Çetin, Tamer & Yasin Eryigit, Kadir, 2013. "The economic effects of government regulation: Evidence from the New York taxicab market," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 169-177.
    8. Michael Breen & Robert Gillanders, 2012. "Corruption, institutions and regulation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 263-285, September.
    9. Michelle C. Pautz, 2009. "Perceptions of the Regulated Community in Environmental Policy: The View from Below," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 26(5), pages 533-550, September.
    10. Yutaka Suzuki, 2021. "Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design in a Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 22(2), pages 317-365, November.
    11. Isik Ozel, 2012. "The politics of de‐delegation: Regulatory (in)dependence in Turkey," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 119-129, March.
    12. Lindemann, Henrik, 2015. "Regulatory Objectives and the Intensity of Unbundling in Electricity Markets," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-544, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    13. Vennesson Pascal, 2010. "Military Strategy in the Global Village," New Global Studies, De Gruyter, vol. 3(3), pages 1-43, February.
    14. Neven, Damien J. & Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 2005. "Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy model of merger control," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 829-848, December.
    15. Koski, Heli, 2002. "The Impacts of Regulatory Reform on the Global Telecommunications Sector," Discussion Papers 649, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    16. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, daniel, 2000. ""Seize the state, seize the day": state capture, corruption, and influence in transition," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2444, The World Bank.
    17. Carlo Altavilla & Miguel Boucinha & José-Luis Peydró & Frank Smets, 2019. "Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Risk-Taking: Big Data Evidence from 15 Credit Registers," Working Papers 1137, Barcelona School of Economics.
    18. Tetty Havinga & Paul Verbruggen, 2017. "Understanding Complex Governance Relationships in Food Safety Regulation," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 670(1), pages 58-77, March.
    19. Liam Wren-Lewis, 2015. "Do Infrastructure Reforms Reduce the Effect of Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 29(2), pages 353-384.
    20. Antonio Cabrales, 2003. "Pharmaceutical generics, vertical product differentiation and public policy," Economics Working Papers 662, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:anname:v:670:y:2017:i:1:p:152-169. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.