IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rvr/journl/201511392.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Prix versus quantités : les contorsions du marché du carbone européen

Author

Listed:
  • Berta, Nathalie

Abstract

Le marché du carbone européen a pour vocation de donner un prix au carbone, prix censé orienter une transition vers des technologies propres. Depuis sa création, il y a dix ans, il connaît des prix très bas et volatils qui, malgré les restrictions successives du plafond d’émissions, se sont révélés incapables de produire les incitations attendues. Face à cet échec, la Commission européenne a récemment entrepris diverses réformes, parmi lesquelles l’établissement d’une réserve de stabilité marchande. Toutes cherchent à contrôler le prix indirectement, en ajustant les quantités de quotas en circulation. Or, le marché du carbone est un instrument de cap-and-trade : il fixe un plafond (cap) qui garantit les réductions d’émissions souhaitées ; l’échange est alors justifié par l’efficacité des ajustements concurrentiels censés garantir que le cap sera atteint au moindre coût collectif. À l’inverse d’une taxe, l’incertitude sur le prix est donc constitutive de l’instrument. On peut alors s’interroger sur la dimension paradoxale de ces réformes : s’en remettre à un instrument marchand — au détriment d’une taxe — pour les vertus prêtées aux ajustements de prix concurrentiels, puis chercher ex post à administrer ces prix. On peut aussi douter de l’efficacité de ces mesures : le marché du carbone étant un marché avant tout financier, aucun ajustement en quantité ne donnera au prix la stabilité requise, stabilité que seule une taxe peut en théorie lui conférer.

Suggested Citation

  • Berta, Nathalie, 2015. "Prix versus quantités : les contorsions du marché du carbone européen," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 18.
  • Handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2015:11392
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://regulation.revues.org/11392
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://regulation.revues.org/pdf/11392
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
    2. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249.
    3. Clive Lawson, 2012. "Aviation lock-in and emissions trading," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 36(5), pages 1221-1243.
    4. Michel Damian, 2014. "La politique climatique change enfin de paradigme," Post-Print halshs-00969308, HAL.
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/10174 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Berta, Nathalie & Bertrand, Elodie, 2014. "Market Internalization Of Externalities: What Is Failing?," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 331-357, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Frans P. Vries & Nick Hanley, 2016. "Incentive-Based Policy Design for Pollution Control and Biodiversity Conservation: A Review," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 687-702, April.
    2. Stavins, Robert, 2001. "Lessons From the American Experiment With Market-Based Environmental Policies," RFF Working Paper Series dp-01-53, Resources for the Future.
    3. Nathalie Berta, 2016. "On the definition of externality as a missing market," Post-Print halshs-01277990, HAL.
    4. Chung, Sung H. & Weaver, Robert D. & Friesz, Terry L., 2013. "Strategic response to pollution taxes in supply chain networks: Dynamic, spatial, and organizational dimensions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 231(2), pages 314-327.
    5. Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, 2019. "Policy Evolution under the Clean Air Act," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 33(4), pages 27-50, Fall.
    6. Jon Rezek & Benjamin F. Blair, 2005. "Abatement Cost Heterogeneity In Phase I Electric Utilities," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(3), pages 324-340, July.
    7. Chuang Li & Subhash C. Ray, 2021. "Opportunity Cost and Employment Effect of Emission Reduction: An Inter-Industry Comparison of Targeted Pollution Reduction," Working papers 2021-13, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    8. Dogterom, Nico & Ettema, Dick & Dijst, Martin, 2018. "Behavioural effects of a tradable driving credit scheme: Results of an online stated adaptation experiment in the Netherlands," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 52-64.
    9. Charles Raux, 2011. "Downstream Emissions Trading for Transport," Transportation Research, Economics and Policy, in: Werner Rothengatter & Yoshitsugu Hayashi & Wolfgang Schade (ed.), Transport Moving to Climate Intelligence, chapter 0, pages 209-226, Springer.
    10. Fershtman, Chaim & de Zeeuw, Aart, 1995. "Tradeable Emission Permits in Oligopoly," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275612, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    11. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Environmental Economics," RFF Working Paper Series dp-04-54, Resources for the Future.
    12. Lori Bennear & Robert Stavins, 2007. "Second-best theory and the use of multiple policy instruments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(1), pages 111-129, May.
    13. Charles Raux, 2008. "Tradable driving rights in urban areas: their potential for tackling congestion and traffic-related pollution," Post-Print halshs-00185012, HAL.
    14. Robert N. Stavins, 1998. "What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 69-88, Summer.
    15. Weber, Thomas A. & Neuhoff, Karsten, 2010. "Carbon markets and technological innovation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 115-132, September.
    16. Peifang Yang & Daniel T. Kaffine, 2016. "Community-Based Tradable Permits for Localized Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(4), pages 773-788, December.
    17. Woodward, Richard T., 2011. "Double-dipping in environmental markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 153-169, March.
    18. Pierre-André Jouvet & Philippe Michel & Jean-Pierre Vidal, 2002. "Effets des permis de pollution sur l’accumulation du capital dans le cadre des modèles à générations imbriquées," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 156(5), pages 63-72.
    19. Parker, Dawn Cassandra, 2007. "Revealing "space" in spatial externalities: Edge-effect externalities and spatial incentives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 84-99, July.
    20. Cohen, Alex & Keiser, David A., 2017. "The effectiveness of incomplete and overlapping pollution regulation: Evidence from bans on phosphate in automatic dishwasher detergent," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 53-74.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2015:11392. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Pascal Seppecher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://theorie-regulation.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.