http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi?action=buy&year=2006&issue=aut&page=692&tid=30492&sc=1869P1N9.">

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Your Network or Mine? The Economics of Routing Rules

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Benjamin Hermalin
Michael L. Katz

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In many markets, including payment cards and telecommunications, service providers operate networks that support customer transactions with each other. When the two sides of a transaction belong to more than one network in common, the question arises as to which network will carry the transaction. We show that the answer depends on a combination of who has the formal authority to choose and the parties' network subscription decisions. Our central finding is that granting formal authority to one side of the market can increase the extent to which transactions run over the network preferred by the other side of the market. We also characterize competing networks' equilibrium choices of routing rules and prices. Ordering information: This article can be ordered from http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi?action=buy&year=2006&issue=aut&page=692&tid=30492&sc=1869P1N9.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 37 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 692-719
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:692-719

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Roberto Roson, 2005. "Platform Competition with Endogenous Multihoming," Working Papers 2005.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  2. Wilko Bolt & Kimmo Soramäki, 2008. "Competition, bargaining power and pricing in two-sided markets," DNB Working Papers 181, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. ROCHET, Jean-Charles & TIROLE, Jean, 2005. "Two-Sided Markets : A Progress Report," IDEI Working Papers 275, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Jean-Charles Rochet Author-Email: rochet@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse & Jean Tirole Author-Email: tirole@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, Autumn.
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create a compilation of all publications of a group of people, say alumni of a program, your students or memers of an association.

This page was last updated on 2008-12-28.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.