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Partnership Dissolution with Interdependent Values

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Author Info
Philippe Jehiel () (PSE)
Ady Pauzner () (Tel Aviv University)

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Abstract

We study partnership dissolution when valuations are interdependent and only one party is informed. In contrast with the case of private values (Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer, 1987), in which efficient trade is feasible whenever initial shares are about equal, there exists a wide class of situations in which full efficiency cannot be reached. In these cases, (i) the subsidy required to restore the first best is minimal when the entire ownership is allocated initially to one of the parties, and (ii) ruling out external subsidies, the second-best welfare is maximized when one of the parties initially has full ownership. Ordering information: This article can be ordered from http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi?action=view&year=2006&issue=spr&page=1.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 37 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 1-22
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:1:p:1-22

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  1. Maria Angeles de Frutos & Thomas Kittsteiner, 2004. "Efficient partnership dissolution under buy/sell clauses," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse1_2004, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Jul 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Nicolas Figueroa & Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "What to put in the table," Documentos de Trabajo 237, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
  3. Paul Schweinzer, 2003. "Dissolving a Common Value Partnership in a Repeated 'queto' Game," Discussion Paper Series dp318, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jianpei Li & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2004. "Partnership Dissolution, Complementarity, and Investment Incentives," Discussion Papers 12, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & S. Viswanathan, 2004. "Merger Mechanisms," Working Papers 2004.7, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2007. "What to Put on the Table," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000374, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. John L. Turner & Emanuel Ornelas, 2004. "Efficient Dissolution of Partnerships and the Structure of Control," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 286, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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