https://pubs3.rand.org/cgi-bin/rje/pdf.cgi.">

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Pollution Markets with Imperfectly Observed Emissions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Juan-Pablo Montero () (Catholic University of Chile and MIT)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

I study the advantages of pollution permit markets over uniform emission (or technology) standards when the regulator has incomplete information on firms' emissions and costs of production and abatement (e.g., air pollution in large cities). Because the regulator observes only each firm's abatement technology but neither its emissions nor its output, there are cases in which standards can lead to lower emissions and, hence, welfare dominate permits. If permits are optimally combined with standards, in many cases this hybrid policy converges to the permits-alone policy but (almost) never to the standards-alone policy. Ordering information: This article can be ordered from https://pubs3.rand.org/cgi-bin/rje/pdf.cgi.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 36 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 645-660
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:3:p:645-660

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kwerel, Evan, 1977. "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 595-601, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Schmalensee, Richard, et al, 1998. "An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 53-68, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Fullerton, Don & West, Sarah E., 2002. "Can Taxes on Cars and on Gasoline Mimic an Unavailable Tax on Emissions?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 135-157, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Stavins, Robert N., 2003. "Experience with market-based environmental policy instruments," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 355-435 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Tracy R. Lewis, 1996. "Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefits Are Privately Known," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 819-847, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian W.H. Parry & Dallas Burtraw, 1997. "Revenue-Raising versus Other Approaches to Environmental Protection: The Critical Significance of Preexisting Tax Distortions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 708-731, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 193-208. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 2002. "Imperfect observability of emissions and second-best emission and output taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 385-407, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Dasgupta, Partha & Hammond, Peter & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(5), pages 857-60, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Montero, Juan-Pablo & Sanchez, Jose Miguel & Katz, Ricardo, 2002. "A Market-Based Environmental Policy Experiment in Chile," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 267-87, April.
    Other versions:
  11. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Roberton Williams, 2002. "Prices vs. Quantities vs. Tradable Quantities," NBER Working Papers 9283, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Spulber, Daniel F., 1988. "Optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 163-181, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Weitzman, Martin L, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(4), pages 477-91, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Montero, J-P., 2004. "Tradable Permits with Incomplete Monitoring: Evidence from Santiago’s Particulate Permits Program," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0457, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Di Novi, Cinzia, 2008. "From theory to implementation of the best instrument to protect human health: a brief overview," P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers 104, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS. [Downloadable!]
  3. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2004. "Markets for environmental protection: design and performance incomplete enforcement," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 31(1 Year 20), pages 79-99, June. [Downloadable!]
  4. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2006. "A simple auction mechanism for the optimal allocation of the commons," Working Papers 0608, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 850 journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-12-28.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.