This document offers a theoretical price regulation model for the postal sector to evaluate the existence of cross subsidies between the regulated and competitive parts of the postal sector. It analyzes agents’ incentives to use cross subsidization when prices are regulated by the Ramsey prices or by the global price cap. It shows that cross subsidies constrain and distort the liberalization of the sector and it is important to avoid them in favor of competition.
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Volume (Year): 8 (2006) Issue (Month): 15 (July-December) Pages: 251-268 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation L87 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Postal and Delivery Services
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