References listed on IDEAS
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1. Fiorina, Morris P & Noll, Roger G, 1978. "Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy: Institutional Design in the Public Sector," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 256-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Fiorina, Morris P. & Noll, Roger G., . "Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy: Institutional Design in the Public Sector," Working Papers 194, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
2. Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1977. "Voting in a Local School Election: A Micro Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 59(1), pages 30-42, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. de Groot, Hans, 1988. "Decentralization decisions in bureaucracies as a principal-agent problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 323-337, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 328. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Becker, Gary S, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation: Comment," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 245-48, August.
6. Kau, James B & Keenan, Donald & Rubin, Paul H, 1982. "A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 271-93, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Walter Hettich & Stanley L. Winer, 1995. "Decision Externalities, Economic Efficiency and Institutional Response," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 21(3), pages 344-361, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Hettich, W. & Winer, S.L., 1993. "Institutional Mechanisms for Efficient Policy," Papers 93-10, Queen's at Kingston - School of Policy Studies.
9. Ashenfelter, Orley C & Kelley, Stanley, Jr, 1975. "Determinants of Participation in Presidential Elections," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 695-733, December.
10. Peltzman, Sam, 1984. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 181-210, April.
11. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1986. "Reforming Public Bureaucracy through Economic Incentives?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 131-61, Spring.
12. Comanor, William S., 1976. "The median voter rule and the theory of political choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1-2), pages 169-177. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. James M. Buchanan, 1949. "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57, pages 496. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Carroll, Kathleen A, 1993. " The Effects of Multiple Objectives in the Theory of Public Sector Supply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 1-20, January.
15. Borcherding, Thomas E & Deacon, Robert T, 1972. "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 891-901, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Walter Hettich & Stanely Winer, 1991. "Economic Efficiency, Political Institutions and Policy Analysis," Carleton Economic Papers 91-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
    • Winer, S.L. & Hettich, W., 1991. "Economic Efficiency, Political Institutions and Policy Analysis.c," Papers 10, Carleton - School of Public Administration.
    • Hettich, Walter & Winer, Stanley L, 1993. "Economic Efficiency, Political Institutions and Policy Analysis," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(1), pages 3-25.
17. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Trebilcock, Michael J. & Hartle, Douglas G., 1982. "The choice of governing instrument," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Hahn, Robert W, 1990. " The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: Towards a Unifying Framework," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 21-47, April.
20. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1982. "Median Voters or Budget Maximizers: Evidence from School Expenditure Referenda," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(4), pages 556-78, October.
21. Crowley, R.W., 1994. "The Public Sector and Public Provision in Economic Theory," Papers 94-08, Queen's at Kingston - School of Policy Studies.
22. Blais, Andre & Nadeau, Richard, 1992. " The Electoral Budget Cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 389-403, December.
23. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. Filimon, Radu & Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1982. "Asymmetric information and agenda control : The bases of monopoly power in public spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 51-70, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
25. Wittman, Donald, 1977. "Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 180-189, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
26. Santerre, Rexford E, 1993. " Representative versus Direct Democracy: The Role of Public Bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 189-98, July.
27. De Groot, Hans & Van der Sluis, Johan, 1987. "Bureaucracy Response to Budget Cuts: An Economic Model," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(1), pages 103-09.
28. Gary S. Becker, 1984. "Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 35, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
    Other versions:
    • Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
29. Peltzman, Sam, 1990. "How Efficient Is the Voting Market?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 27-63, April.
    Other versions:
    • Sam Peltzman, 1988. "How Efficient Is the Voting Market?," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 53, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
30. von Hagen, Jurgen & Harden, Ian J., 1995. "Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 771-779, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Jürgen von Hagen & Ian Harden, 1996. "Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline," IMF Working Papers 96/78, International Monetary Fund.
31. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 563-87, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
32. Dougan, William R & Snyder, James M, 1993. " Are Rents Fully Dissipated?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 793-813, December.
33. North, Douglass C, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
34. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-43, December.
35. Breton, Albert & Wintrobe, Ronald, 1992. "Freedom of speech vs. efficient regulation in markets for ideas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 217-239, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
36. Kitchen, H., 1993. "Efficient Delivery of Local Government Services," Papers 93-15, Queen's at Kingston - School of Policy Studies.
37. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)