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L'évolution de la supervision bancaire et de la réglementation prudentielle (1945-1996)

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  • Dominique Lacoue-Labarthe

Abstract

[eng] The evolution of banking supervision and prudential regulation (1945-1996) . The United States long relied on banking supervision and regulatory structure (bank charters, deposit insurance and risk-adjusted capital standards) to prevent financial instability. On the contrary, European countries had a tradition of strong central banking and credit policies, which were considered as efficient as comprehensive regulations. Both systems equally failed to avoid systemic risk because of central banks passivity or incentive defects in the regulatory structure. In the 1970s, with increasingly interdependent euromarkets, the G-10 and EEC countries reinforced monetary policies and harmonized prudential regulations. The Basel concordat established an international responsibility of the home country's banking supervisory authorities and the Cooke ratio generalized the US type of capital adequacy regulation. Intrinsic deficiencies implied however seeking further improvements to address more efficiently moral hazard issues. . JEL classifications : E44, G21, G28, N24 [fre] Les États-Unis ont longtemps assuré la stabilité financière par la supervision bancaire et le contrôle prudentiel. Les Européens avaient des Banques centrales fortes et des politiques du crédit qui rendaient superflus les contrôles prudentiels. Les deux systèmes échouèrent à éviter les crises systémiques en raison de la passivité des Banques centrales ou des incitations défectueuses propres aux structures prudentielles. Après 1973, avec l'interdépendance accrue des euromarchés, les États du G10 et de l'Union européenne renforcèrent leur politique monétaire er harmonisèrent leurs réglementations prudentielles. Le Concordat de Bâle établit une responsabilité internationale des autorités de surveillance du pays d'origine et le ratio Cooke généralisa le modèle américain d'adéquation du capital. On s'efforcera par la suite de corriger les défauts de ces instruments par une meilleure maîtrise du risque moral qu'ils engendrent. . Classification JEL : E44, G21, G28, N24

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Lacoue-Labarthe, 2003. "L'évolution de la supervision bancaire et de la réglementation prudentielle (1945-1996)," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 73(4), pages 39-63.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2003_num_73_4_4999
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2003.4999
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2003.4999
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1988. "Risk and solvency regulation of depository institutions: past policies and current options," Staff Memoranda 88-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    2. R. Alton Gilbert & Courtenay C. Stone & Michael E. Trebing, 1985. "The new bank capital adequacy standards," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 67(May), pages 12-20.
    3. Bodenhorn, Howard, 2002. "State Banking in Early America: A New Economic History," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195147766.
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    Cited by:

    1. Djimoudjiel Djekonbe, 2018. "Banking Capitalization and Financial Development in Chad: The Comparative Effects of The Banking Process," Economic Research Guardian, Weissberg Publishing, vol. 8(2), pages 65-77, December.
    2. Djimoudjiel, Djekonbe, 2018. "Normes prudentielles et risques bancaires : une analyse économétrique des implications sur la structure du marché bancaire dans la CEMAC [Prudential Standards and Banking Risks: An Econometric Anal," MPRA Paper 88411, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, in: Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan (ed.), 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons and Challenges, chapter 8, pages 263-318, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-

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