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Les conflits d'intérêt entre travailleurs qualifiés et travailleurs non qualifiés

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  • Pierre Granier
  • Philippe Michel

Abstract

[fre] Les conflits d'intérêt entre travailleurs qualifiés et travailleurs non qualifiés, . par Pierre Granier, Philippe Michel.. . Cet article montre, dans le cadre d'un modèle très simplifié, l'existence d'un conflit d'intérêt pouvant opposer les travailleurs qualifiés à ceux qui sont dépourvus de qualification. Plus précisément, il suggère qu'en présence d'imperfections du marché du travail, les travailleurs qualifiés peuvent s'approprier une rente de situation générant du chômage parmi les travailleurs non qualifiés. Un système linéaire de taxes et de subventions peut accroître l'emploi sans faire disparaître cette rente de situation. [eng] Clashes of Interest Between Skilled Workers and Unskilled Workers, . by Pierre Granier and Philippe Michel.. . This articles uses a highly simplified model to prove the existence of a clash of interest capable of bringing skilled workers into conflict with those lacking in qualifications. To be more precise, it suggests that skilled workers can benefit from labour market imperfections to gain a situation rent generating unemployment among unskilled workers. A linear tax and subsidy system could increase employment without eliminating this situation rent. [ger] Die Interessenkonflikte zwischen qualifizierten und unqualifizierten Arbeitnehmern, . von Pierre Granier, Philippe Michel.. . Im Rahmen eines sehr vereinfachten Modells wird in diesem Artikel das mögliche Auftreten eines Interessenkonfliktes zwischen qualifizierten und unquaUfizierten Arbeitnehmern aufgezeigt. Insbesondere wird die Vermutung nahegelegt, daß sich die qualifizierten Beschäftigten bei Unvollkommenheiten des Arbeitsmarktes einen Besitzstand aneignen können, der bei den unqualifizierten Beschäftigten Arbeitslosigkeit verursacht. Ein lineares Abgaben- und Subventionssystem kann die Beschäftigung ohne Beseitigung dieses Besitzstandes erhöhen. [spa] Los conflictos de interés entre trabajdores cualificados y trabajadores no cualificados, . por Pierre Granier, Philippe Michel.. . Este artículo muestra, dentro del marco de un modelo muy simplificado, la existencia de un conflicto de interés que puede oponer a los trabajadores cualificados a aquellos que no tienen cualificación. Para ser más precisos, sugiere que al haber imperfecciones del mercado de trabajo, los trabajadores cualificados pueden sacar provecho de una situación que genera paro entre los trabajadores no cualificados. Un sistema linear de tasas y subsidios puede incrementar el empleo sin hacer desaparecer esta situación.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Granier & Philippe Michel, 1994. "Les conflits d'intérêt entre travailleurs qualifiés et travailleurs non qualifiés," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 115(4), pages 125-139.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1994_num_115_4_5691
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1994.5691
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1994.5691
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Christian Gianella & Sandrine Duchêne & Sébastien Doisy, 2004. "Un modèle d’appariement avec hétérogénéité du facteur travail : un nouvel outil d’évaluation des politiques économiques," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 162(1), pages 1-22.
    2. Fabrice Collard & Raquel Fonseca & Rafael Munoz, 2002. "Spanish Unemployment Persistence and the Ladder Effect," CEP Discussion Papers dp0538, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    3. Carraro, Carlo & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2005. "Labour demand with heterogeneous workers: Migrations and unemployment," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 119-136, June.
    4. Laffargue, Jean-Pierre, 1995. "Charges sociales, qualifications et emploi. étude à l'aide d'un modèle d'équilibre général calculable de l'économie française," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9502, CEPREMAP.
    5. Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Mouez Fodha, 2005. "Double Dividend with Involuntary Unemployment: Efficiency and Intergenerational Equity," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(4), pages 389-403, August.
    6. Didier Blanchet, 1995. "Inégalité, spécialisation, progrès technique et développement de services non qualifiés locaux," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 120(4), pages 1-13.
    7. Mouez Fodha & Patricia Le Maitre, 2007. "Transition démographique, chômage involontaire et redistribution intergénérationnelle : simulations dans un cadre d'équilibre général à générations imbriquées," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne v07011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

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