IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prg/jnlpol/v2012y2012i3id846p349-361.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Listinné akcie na majitele a veřejné zakázky
[Bearer Shares in Paper Form and Public Procurement]

Author

Listed:
  • Jana Chvalkovská
  • Petr Janský
  • Jiří Skuhrovec

Abstract

This article examines for the first time the relationship between transparency of ownership structure and (i) profits of firms winning public procurement contracts and (ii) competition for the contracts and savings of the public authority. These characteristics are compared for two groups of public procurement contract winners that differ by their ownership structure. The detailed data from the Czech Republic are used and the firms with bearer shares in paper form serve as the less transparent firms. The results show that less transparent firms have significantly higher profit margins in terms of tens of percentage points and participate in less competitive public procurement contracts and result into lower savings for the public authority. This could be an indirect indicator of conflict of interests or corruption. The article concludes with policy recommendations.

Suggested Citation

  • Jana Chvalkovská & Petr Janský & Jiří Skuhrovec, 2012. "Listinné akcie na majitele a veřejné zakázky [Bearer Shares in Paper Form and Public Procurement]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2012(3), pages 349-361.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2012:y:2012:i:3:id:846:p:349-361
    DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.846
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://polek.vse.cz/doi/10.18267/j.polek.846.html
    Download Restriction: free of charge
    File URL: http://polek.vse.cz/doi/10.18267/j.polek.846.pdf
    Download Restriction: free of charge
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.18267/j.polek.846?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Deborah Haas‐Wilson & Martin Gaynor, 1998. "Physician networks and their implications for competition in health care markets," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(2), pages 179-182, March.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
    3. Karel Janda, 2001. "Signalling and underutilization of import quota," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(4), pages 351-365.
    4. Dejong, Dv & Forsythe, R & Lundholm, Rj & Uecker, Wc, 1985. "A Laboratory Investigation Of The Moral Hazard Problem In An Agency Relationship," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23, pages 81-120.
    5. Karel Janda, 2006. "Lender and Borrower as Principal and Agent," Working Papers IES 2006/24, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2006.
    6. Roberta Longo & Marisa Miraldo & Andrew Street, 2008. "Price regulation of pluralistic markets subject to provider collusion," Working Papers 045cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    7. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    8. Avner Shaked & John Sutton, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13.
    9. Karel Janda, 2007. "Instituce státní úvěrové podpory v České republice [available in Czech only]," Working Papers IES 2007/20, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jun 2007.
    10. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    11. Jaskold Gabszewicz, J. & Thisse, J. -F., 1979. "Price competition, quality and income disparities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 340-359, June.
    12. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1998. "Asymétrie d'information et financement des hôpitaux. Une comparaison des modes d'organisation du système de santé," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(5), pages 1323-1343.
    13. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zuzana Špinerová, 2014. "Public Procurement and its Impact on Financial Indicators of Companies in the Construction Sector in Slovakia [Verejné obstarávanie a jeho vplyv na finančné ukazovatele firiem v sektore stavebníctv," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2014(3), pages 61-76.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Martin Janíčko & Ivo Koubek, 2012. "Informační asymetrie a systém dvojího standardu ve vztahu zdravotník - pacient [Information Assymetry and Double Standard in the Doctor-Patient Relationship]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2012(3), pages 362-379.
    2. Langinier Corinne & Babcock Bruce A., 2008. "Agricultural Production Clubs: Viability and Welfare Implications," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-31, December.
    3. Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary, 2011. "Optimal contracts with team production and hidden information: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 163-176, February.
    4. Bonroy, Olivier & Lemarié, Stéphane, 2012. "Downstream labeling and upstream price competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 347-360.
    5. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1993. "Advertising as Information: Matching Products to Buyers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 199-243, June.
    6. Baltzer, Kenneth, 2012. "Standards vs. labels with imperfect competition and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 61-63.
    7. Radoslav Raykov, 2014. "Uncertain Costs and Vertical Differentiation in an Insurance Duopoly," Staff Working Papers 14-14, Bank of Canada.
    8. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.
    9. Edward J. D. Webb, 2017. "If It’s All the Same to You: Blurred Consumer Perception and Market Structure," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(1), pages 1-25, February.
    10. Olivier Bonroy & Christos Constantatos, 2015. "On the Economics of Labels: How Their Introduction Affects the Functioning of Markets and the Welfare of All Participants," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 97(1), pages 239-259.
    11. André, Francisco J., 2015. "Strategic Effects and the Porter Hypothesis," MPRA Paper 62237, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Alessio Emanuele Biondo & Alfio Giarlotta & Alessandro Pluchino & Andrea Rapisarda, 2016. "Perfect Information vs Random Investigation: Safety Guidelines for a Consumer in the Jungle of Product Differentiation," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(1), pages 1-26, January.
    13. de Palma, Andre & Kilani, Moez, 2008. "Regulation in the automobile industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 150-167, January.
    14. repec:gbl:wpaper:2013-01 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Fluet, Claude & Garella, Paolo G., 2002. "Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 907-930, September.
    16. Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2021. "Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(8), pages 2623-2659, August.
    17. Ashantha Ranasinghe & Xuejuan Su, 2023. "When social assistance meets market power: A mixed duopoly view of health insurance in the United States," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(4), pages 851-869, October.
    18. Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2020. "The Social Costs of Side Trading," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(630), pages 1608-1622.
    19. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    20. Pierre M. Picard & Alessandro Tampieri, 2016. "Income Effects and Vertical Differentiation in International Trade," DEM Discussion Paper Series 16-05, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    21. Alessandro Spiganti, 2022. "Wealth Inequality and the Exploration of Novel Alternatives," Working Papers 2022:02, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".

    More about this item

    Keywords

    profitability; Czech Republic; corruption; Public Procurement; bearer shares; bearer shares in paper form; ownership structure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2012:y:2012:i:3:id:846:p:349-361. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Stanislav Vojir (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/uevsecz.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.