Hume, Masaryk, Brentano: skepticismus vs pravděpodobnost I

Masarykʼs and Brentanoʼs attempts at overcoming Humean scepticism by means of probability calculus represent a kind of "third way" between Kantian apriorism and submitting to Humeʼs subtle arguments. In Masaryk, this attempt should have become an integral part of his project of "new inductive logic" which (in line with Leibniz) would serve as the logical basis for the ars inveniendi. Masaryk adopts Humeʼs conception of analytical judgements but at the same time he is attracted to Adolf Fickʼs theory according to which probability calculus consists of synthetic judgements a priori; he also refers in a remarkable way to Bernoulliʼs Law of Large Numbers. All this results in Masarykʼs concluding that the Law of Large Numbers is a guarantee for correspondence between the a priori propositions of probability calculus and reality, which, in Masarykʼs view, implies that Humeʼs basic sceptical thesis on the incompatibility of experience with understanding is refuted. Nevertheless, Masarykʼs attempt was not successful because no application of probability calculus as dealing with random events can lead to laying foundation for the Law of Causality (as including the thesis of the uniformity of causal determination) which was the main object of Humeʼs critical attack.