PABLO MORÁN V () (Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales, Universidad de Talca)
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of adopting an optional provision contained in a broader regulatory change in Chile (tender offer law or Ley de OPAs). Although the motivation for the Ley de OPAs was to strengthen corporate governance mechanisms in Chile, the availability of this optional provision (transitory article ten) for the controlling shareholders was believed to work the opposite way. In this paper we find no evidence indicating that the decision to adopt this transitory article significantly harmed minority shareholders. Several robustness checks confirm this. However, the evidence indicates that these firms realized on average significantly positive abnormal returns in the weeks that followed the decision. This abnormal return is significant only for firms with less concentrated ownership. We conjecture that this positive reaction is related to the decision to adopt the transitory article.
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Article provided by Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal ABANTE.
Volume (Year): 6 (2003) Issue (Month): 2 () Pages: 117-147 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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