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Renegotiation and the Impossibility of Optimal Investment

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  • Persons, John C

Abstract

In a model with asymmetric information and external equity financing, it is impossible to achieve socially optimal investment because of renegotiation possibilities. The contractual solution suggested by Dybvig and Zender (1991) is not dynamically consistent--the manager's contract would be renegotiated, resulting in inefficient investment. Moreover, no other compensation contract that would induce the manager to invest efficiently survives renegotiation. Contracts that pay the manager based on the stock price, while producing suboptimal investment as in Myers and Majluf (1984), are robust to renegotiation. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Persons, John C, 1994. "Renegotiation and the Impossibility of Optimal Investment," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(2), pages 419-449.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:7:y:1994:i:2:p:419-49
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    Cited by:

    1. Caroline Fohlin, 1998. "Banking systems and economic growth: lessons from Britain and Germany in the pre-World War I era," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 37-48.
    2. Kanniainen, Vesa, 2000. "Empire building by corporate managers:: the corporation as a savings instrument," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 127-142, January.
    3. Alfred Wagenhofer, 2014. "Trading off Costs and Benefits of Frequent Financial Reporting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 389-401, May.
    4. John C. Persons, "undated". "Fully Revealing Equilibria with Suboptimal Investment," Research in Financial Economics 9507, Ohio State University.
    5. Frank Gigler & Chandra Kanodia & Haresh Sapra & Raghu Venugopalan, 2014. "How Frequent Financial Reporting Can Cause Managerial Short‐Termism: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Increasing Reporting Frequency," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 357-387, May.
    6. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Financial Contracting," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1079-1100, December.
    7. Kang, Jun-Koo & Stulz, Rene M, 1996. "How Different Is Japanese Corporate Finance? An Investigation of the Information Content of New Security Issues," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 109-139.
    8. Alan V. S. Douglas, 2003. "Corporate Investment Incentives and Accounting†Based Debt Covenants," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(4), pages 645-683, December.
    9. Douglas, Alan V. S., 2002. "Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 287-311, October.
    10. Persons, John C., 2000. "Fully revealing equilibria with suboptimal investment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 331-344, September.
    11. Yermack, David, 2006. "Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 211-242, April.
    12. Chen, Tai-Yuan & Zhang, Guochang & Zhou, Yi, 2018. "Enforceability of non-compete covenants, discretionary investments, and financial reporting practices: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 41-60.
    13. Walter Novaes, 2002. "Managerial Turnover and Leverage under a Takeover Threat," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2619-2650, December.
    14. Timothy King & Jonathan Williams, 2013. "Bank Efficiency and Executive Compensation," Working Papers 13009, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
    15. Chemmanur, Thomas J. & Ravid, S. Abraham, 1999. "Asymmetric Information, Corporate Myopia, and Capital Gains Tax Rates: An Analysis of Policy Prescriptions," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 205-231, July.
    16. Singh, Rajdeep & Yerramilli, Vijay, 2014. "Market efficiency, managerial compensation, and real efficiency," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 561-578.
    17. Baranchuk, Nina & Dybvig, Philip H. & Yang, Jun, 2010. "Renegotiation-proof contracting, disclosure, and incentives for efficient investment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1805-1836, September.
    18. Hayes, Rachel M. & Schaefer, Scott, 2009. "CEO pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 280-290, November.

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