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Transparency and Talent Allocation in Money Management

Author

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  • Simon Gervais
  • Günter Strobl
  • Francesca Cornelli

Abstract

We construct and analyze the equilibrium of a model of delegated portfolio management in which money managers signal their investment skills via fund transparency. To lower the costs of transparency, high-skill managers rely on their performance to separate from low-skill managers over time. In contrast, medium-skill managers rely on transparency to separate, especially when it is difficult for investors to tell them apart through performance alone. Low-skill managers mimic high-skill managers in opaque funds, hoping to replicate their performance and compensation. The model yields several novel empirical predictions that contrast transparent and opaque funds.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Gervais & Günter Strobl & Francesca Cornelli, 2020. "Transparency and Talent Allocation in Money Management," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(8), pages 3889-3924.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:8:p:3889-3924.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhz116
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    Cited by:

    1. Gorovyy, Sergiy & Kelly, Patrick J. & Kuzmina, Olga, 2021. "Does secrecy signal skill? Own-investor secrecy and hedge fund performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    2. Li, Li & Huang, Shiyang & Lou, Dong & Shi, Jiahong, 2021. "Why don't most mutual funds short sell?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118854, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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