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The Proportional Veto Principle

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  • Hervé Moulin

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  • Hervé Moulin, 1981. "The Proportional Veto Principle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(3), pages 407-416.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:48:y:1981:i:3:p:407-416.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2297154
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Margarita Kirneva & Matias Nunez, 2021. "Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes," Working Papers 2021-08, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Munda, Giuseppe, 2009. "A conflict analysis approach for illuminating distributional issues in sustainability policy," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 194(1), pages 307-322, April.
    3. Sinan Ertemel & Levent Kutlu & M. Remzi Sanver, 2015. "Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 187-201, June.
    4. M. Remzi Sanver, 2018. "Implementing Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational Outcomes by Veto," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 223-233, April.
    5. Abdou, Joseph, 2010. "A stability index for local effectivity functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 306-313, May.
    6. Suzana de Suzana Dantas Daher & Adiel Teixeira Almeida, 2012. "The Use of Ranking Veto Concept to Mitigate the Compensatory Effects of Additive Aggregation in Group Decisions on a Water Utility Automation Investment," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 185-204, March.
    7. Diffo Lambo, Lawrence & Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Wambo, Pierre, 2015. "Networked politics: political cycles and instability under social influences," MPRA Paper 65641, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Klaus Nehring & Massimiliano Marcellino, 2003. "Monotonicity Implies Strategy-Proofness For Correspondences," Working Papers 193, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    9. Gurvich, Vladimir, 2008. "War and peace in veto voting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 185(1), pages 438-443, February.
    10. Anna bogomolnaia Ron Holzman Herve Moulin, 2021. "Wost Case in Voting and Bargaining," Papers 2104.02316, arXiv.org.
    11. Antonio Jiménez-Martín & Eduardo Gallego & Alfonso Mateos & Juan A. Fernández Pozo, 2017. "Restoring a Radionuclide Contaminated Aquatic Ecosystem: A Group Decision Making Problem with Incomplete Information within MAUT Accounting for Veto," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 653-675, July.
    12. Gamboa, Gonzalo & Munda, Giuseppe, 2007. "The problem of windfarm location: A social multi-criteria evaluation framework," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 1564-1583, March.
    13. Anna Bogomolnaia & Ron Holzman & Hervé Moulin, 2021. "Worst Case in Voting and Bargaining," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03196999, HAL.
    14. Aleksei Y. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020. "Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 187-210, April.
    15. Kurz, Sascha & Mayer, Alexander & Napel, Stefan, 2020. "Weighted committee games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(3), pages 972-979.
    16. Cardona-Coll, Daniel, 1997. "Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 101-113, April.
    17. Matthew C. Weinzierl, 2012. "Why do we Redistribute so Much but Tag so Little? The principle of equal sacrifice and optimal taxation," NBER Working Papers 18045, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Diffo Lambo, Lawrence & Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Wambo, Pierre, 2015. "Networked Politics: Political Cycles and Instability under Social Influences," MPRA Paper 65598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Dennis Mueller, 1999. "Fundamental Issues in Constitutional Reform: With Special Reference to Latin America and the United States," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 119-148, June.

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